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JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND
TRIAL: WADING THROUGH THE
RHETORIC AND THE EVIDENCE
JOSEPH B. SANBORN, JR., PHD*
This Article examines and refutes the validity of the explosion of
claims in the literature that juveniles are not competent to stand trial in
criminal court. After providing a framework through which to analyze the
legal relationship between juvenile defendants and the requirements for
competency to stand trial, this Article summarizes the current advocacy
presented by researchers in favor of finding that juvenile defendants are
categorically incompetent to stand trial. However, this Article argues that
the research in support of such a finding relies upon faulty premises and
suffers from critical methodological problems. In support of this
conclusion, this Article surveys various studies of juvenile competence
undertaken by developmental psychologists, and explains that many such
studies share particular logical and practical flaws. Thus, this Article
argues that there is in fact no categorical problem ofjuvenile incompetency
to stand trial, and that the solutions proposed to solve this so-called
problem are in fact worse than the legal dilemma itself This Article
concludes with a number of proposals that would better serve to protect the
rights of juvenile defendants, in lieu of a universal finding that such
defendants are incompetent to stand trial.
I. THE PROBLEM: MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING COMPETENT
TO STAND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL COURT ..................................................... 137
II. THE ISSUE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUVENILE DEFENDANTS
AND COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL ........................................................ 138
* Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies at the
University of Central Florida. B.A., Villanova University; M.A., Ph.D, State University of
New York at Albany.
JOSEPH B. SANBORN, JR.
A. THE APPLICATION OF DUSKY TO DEFENDANTS IN JUVENILE COURT... 138
B. DUSKYAND COMPETENCY STANDARDS FOR DEFENDANTS IN
JUVENILE C OURT ............................................................................ 140
C. MENTALLY CHALLENGED DEFENDANTS FOUND COMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT ................................................ 143
D. PROVISIONS FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND
TRIAL 1N JUVENILE COURT ............................................................. 145
E. DUSKY AND JUVENILE DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURT .................. 147
III. THE ADVOCACY: MILITATING TO PREVENT THE PROSECUTION OF
JUVENILES IN CRIMINAL COURT ............................................................... 149
A. THE CASE FOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIVE INCOMPETENCY (JAI) ......... 150
B. GENERAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS ON JUVENILES' LEGAL
A B ILITIES ........................................................................................ 152
C. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUVENILES' COMPENTENCY TO STAND
T R IA L .............................................................................................. 154
D. THE CASE, SUCH AS IT IS: A SUMMARY OF THE JAI RESEARCH .......... 181
IV. THE OBSTACLE: SEVERAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE CLAIM
THAT JUVENILES ARE INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL ........................... 182
A. DPs' FAULTY PREMISES ABOUT JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO
STAN D T RIAL .................................................................................. 183
1. That Competency to Stand Trial is Relative or That There Are
D egrees of Com petence .......................................................... 183
2. That Juveniles on Average Are Less Competent to Stand Trial Than
Adults Means That All Juveniles Are Incompetent to Stand
T rial ......................................................................................... 18 4
3. That Some or Most Juveniles of a Certain Age Are Actually
Incompetent to Stand Trial Means All Juveniles of That
Age Are Incompetent to Stand Trial ....................................... 187
4. That Competency to Stand Trial is About Maturity of Judgment and
Perfect D efendants .................................................................. 188
5. That Competency to Stand Trial Requires Belief in the Ideals of the
A dversary Process ................................................................... 194
6. That Competency to Stand Trial Requires Defendants Share DPs'
V alues and Perspectives .......................................................... 196
7. That Competency to Stand Trial Matters Less in Juvenile Court
Than in Crim inal Court ........................................................... 197
B. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DPs' STUDY OF JUVENILES'
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL ..................................................... 197
1. Competency to Stand Trial Research Tests Do Not Actually
M easure Com petency .............................................................. 197
2. Examining a Defendant's Miranda Comprehension Does Not
Determine Competency to Stand Trial .................................... 200
[Vol. 99
JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
3. Examining Only Delinquents, Especially Only Those Detained,
Does Not Yield a Representative Juvenile Competency to
Stand Trial Score ..................................................................... 201
4. The Lack of a Standard Measure of Adults' Competency to Stand
Trial Compromises Research .................................................. 202
V. THE ULTIMATE PROBLEMS IN THE DPs' STUDY OF JUVENILE
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL ................................................................ 202
A. THE LACK OF A JUVENILE COMPETENCY PROBLEM ............................ 202
B. THE DPs' PROPOSED SOLUTION IS WORSE THAN THE PROBLEM ........ 205
1. T he D Ps' Solution ................................................................................. 205
2. The DPs' Proposal Fails on Its M erits .................................................. 207
3. The DPs' Solution Is Inappropriate ...................................................... 209
4. The DPs' Solution Is Unnecessary ........................................................ 210
VI. THE CONCLUSION: MYTHS DISPELLED AND LESSONS LEARNED
CONCERNING JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL ...................... 211
A . M YTHS D ISPELLED ............................................................................... 211
1. Massive Numbers of Juvenile Defendants Are Incompetent to Stand
T rial ................................................................................... 2 1 1
2. Competency to Stand Trial Is Relative, Group-Determined, and
Associated with Punishm ent ............................................. 211
B . L essons L earned ................................................................................... 2 12
1. Ideology and Not a Constitutional Right Is Driving Research
Regarding Competency to Stand Trial .............................. 212
2. Juveniles Need Classroom Instruction on Their Rights ........................ 212
3. Juvenile Defendants Require Extra Attention from Defense Counsel.. 213
I. THE PROBLEM: MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BEING COMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL IN CRIMINAL COURT
Historically, the right to be competent to stand trial has required little
in a defendant's wherewithal. A finding of competency to stand trial
requires little, probably because the more that it demands, the fewer the
defendants that will answer for their crimes. Even so, the right to be
competent to stand trial is considered fundamental. Only if defendants are
competent can a meaningful exercise of their trial-related rights occur. For
example, an incompetent defendant is unable to assist counsel, to testify, or
to effectively confront and cross-examine accusers, and perhaps unable to
receive a fair trial.
The competency standard was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1960 in Dusky v. United States.1  To be competent to stand trial,
362 U.S. 402,402 (1960).
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defendants must have a rational and factual understanding of the nature of
the proceedings against them, and an ability to consult with a lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.2  Thus, if defendants are
basically aware that they are on trial for committing crimes-and could be
headed to probation, jail, or prison-and can communicate with their
attorneys about those offenses, they are likely to be found competent.
Typically, a serious mental illness or an advanced stage of mental
retardation would have to exist for a defendant to be incompetent to stand
trial. Appellate courts have upheld the criminal prosecutions of mentally ill
and retarded defendants who have been diagnosed as neurotic, psychotic, or
paranoid schizophrenic, including those with low IQs. 3 Even those with
amnesia have been found competent to stand trial.4
II. THE ISSUE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUVENILE DEFENDANTS AND
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Regardless of its limits, the Dusky standard applies to criminal court.
Both juvenile and adult defendants in criminal court certainly have a
constitutional right to be competent to stand trial. However, it is not as
certain whether Dusky applies equally to juvenile court, and whether Dusky
standards should differ for juvenile defendants in criminal court.
A. THE APPLICATION OF DUSKY TO DEFENDANTS IN JUVENILE COURT
All appellate courts in recent times have held that youths have to be
competent in order to face an adjudicatory hearing in the juvenile system.
6
In re Gault made a youth's competency relevant by granting juvenile
defendants basic trial-related rights.7 In re Gault has been used to
2 Id.
3 See Annotation, Competency to Stand Trial of Criminal Defendant Diagnosed as
"Schizophrenic"-Modern State Cases, 33 A.L.R. 4th 1062 (1984); Deborah B. Dove,
Annotation, Competency to Stand Trial of Criminal Defendant Diagnosed as "Mentally
Retarded"-Modern Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4th 493 (1983).
4 See Dennis Koson & Ames Robey, Amnesia and Competency to Stand Trial, 130 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 588 (1973); Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Amnesia as Affecting Capacity
to Commit Crime or Stand Trial, 46 A.L.R. 3d 544 (1972).
5 See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162
(1975).
6 The one exception to this is that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held several
years ago that due to the rehabilitative nature of juvenile court proceedings, competency is
not required ofjuvenile defendants. See G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App.
1989).
7 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In re Gault granted the right to notice of charges, counsel, the
protection against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Id.
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recognize a due process or fundamental right to competency to stand trial in
juvenile court.8 This has occurred even when state statutes have been silent
regarding competency to stand trial and juvenile court judges have been
opposed to recognizing the right.9
Appellate courts have held that the right to counsel has little meaning
if the juvenile is incompetent to stand trial, 10 and that counsel cannot be
effective if youths are unable to communicate or to cooperate with their
attorneys. 11  Moreover, the competency requirement ensures that the
juvenile understands the nature of the charges,' 2 and can prepare and
present a defense, increasing the accuracy of the proceedings.
13
Competency is necessary to be able to confront and cross-examine
witnesses,' 4 and to be able to testify.' 5 Even the right to be present at a
hearing demands competency to stand trial. 16 Adjudicating a juvenile who
8 See, e.g., State v. J.S., No. 0312013339, 2005 Del. Fain. Ct. LEXIS 75, at *11 n.2
(Fam. Ct. Aug. 2, 2005), aff'd sub nom., Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. 2007); In re
K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 2004); State ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 2d 472, 474 (La. 1978);
In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Minn. 1979); In re Jeffrey C., 366 N.Y.S.2d
826, 829-30 (Fam. Ct. 1975); In re B.M.S., 847 N.E.2d 506, 509-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006);
In re Smith, No. 5-01-34, 2002 WL 255126, at *2 n.5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2002); In re
Lloyd, No. 96-CA-86, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1004, at *4-5 (Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1997); In re
McWhorter, No. CA94-02-047, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5421, at *4 (Ct. App. Dec. 5, 1994);
In re Johnson, No. 7998, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 14017, at *12 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1983); In
re D.G., 698 N.E.2d 533, 534-35 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Juv. Div. 1998); see also In re B.M.R.,
No. 2005-CA-1, 2005 WL 2978951, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2005); In re Wood, No.
04CA0005-M, 2004 WL 2808913, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004); In re Adams, No. 01-
CA-237, 2003 WL 21783682, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 2003); In re Bailey, 782 N.E.2d
1177, 1179 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); In re Grimes, 769 N.E.2d 420, 422-23 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002); In re Anderson, No. 2001AP030021, 2002 WL 253855, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13,
2002); In re Williams, 687 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); State v. E.C., 922 P.2d
152, 155-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
9 See, e.g., In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1266-67 & n.6 (D.C. 1990); In re S.H., 469
S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); In re T.D.W., 441 N.E.2d 155, 156-57 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982), overruled by People v. Gentry, 815 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re Carey,
615 N.W.2d 742, 745-46 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re Welfare of D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278,
281-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
10 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 619 P.2d 12, 15 (Ariz. 1980); Golden
v. State, 21 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Ark. 2000); In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 811.
11 See James H. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 398, 400 (Ct. App. 1978); In re Carey,
615 N.W.2d at 746; In re Two Minor Children, 592 P.2d 166, 169 (Nev. 1979).
12 See In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d at 811.
'" See In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d at 1267; ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 2d at 476.
14 See In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d at 745.
'5 See id.
16 See In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d at 1267; ex rel. Causey, 363 So. 2d at 476; see also
Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court in
Massachusetts: Issues in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
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is incompetent to stand trial violates due process requirements even if the
court seeks rehabilitation. 17  For rehabilitation to be legitimate, the
necessary precedent is a determination that a youth has violated the law. 18
B. DUSKY AND COMPETENCY STANDARDS FOR DEFENDANTS IN
JUVENILE COURT
Recently, several states have adopted formal positions regarding
competency to stand trial in juvenile court. Nevertheless, twenty states
continue to process defendants in juvenile court without a clearly and
broadly applicable competency standard. 19 Thirteen states have mostly or
completely transported Dusky or their criminal court provision on
competency to stand trial to juvenile court.20 Finally, eighteen jurisdictions
have adopted specific standards on competency to stand trial in juvenile
court, via either juvenile court statutes or court rules.21
CONFINEMENT 321, 327 (1994) ("If a person is not mentally present and able to defend
oneself, then it is not fair to proceed against him or her.").
17 See In re J.M., 769 A.2d 656 (Vt. 2001).
18 In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d at 1267.
19 See infra tbl. 1. Alaska's Delinquency Rule 17(c) says notice of intention to offer
evidence of mental disease or defect in juvenile court is governed by the relevant criminal
court statute. ALASKA DELINQ. R. 17(c). It does not appear that this rule includes any
provision for competency to stand trial per se.
20 For states using Dusky or their criminal court competency provision, see ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-502(a)(1) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3318 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7B-2401 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-410(A) (Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-
6A-9 (LexisNexis 2008); State v. J.S., No. 0312013339, 2005 Del. Farn. Ct. LEXIS 75, at
*10-15 (Fain. Ct. Aug. 2, 2005), affd sub nom. Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144 (Del. 2007);
In re T.D.W., 441 N.E.2d 155, 156-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), overruled by People v. Gentry,
815 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 637-38 (Ind. 2004); In re
A.B., No. 5-791/05-0868, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 189, at *7-9 (Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2006); In
re Carey, 615 N.W.2d at 746-47; In re Two Minor Children, 592 P.2d 166, 169 (Nev. 1979);
In re Johnson, No. 7998, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 14017, at *12-14 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1983);
State v. E.C., 922 P.2d 152, 155-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
21 For jurisdictions creating a juvenile court rule or statute, see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-291.02 (2007); CAL. FAM. & Juv. R. 5.645; COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-1301 (2008);
CONN. SUPER. CT. R. 31A-14; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19 (West Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-152 (West 2007);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2348 (Supp. 2007); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 832 (2004 & Supp.
2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-17.1 (LexisNexis 2006); MINN. R. JUv.
DELINQ. PROC. 20.01; N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-17 (2008); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 322.1
(McKinney 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.31 (Vernon 2008); VT. R. FAM. PROC. 1();
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356 (2003 & Supp. 2008); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 938.295 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-219 (2007).
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Table 1
State of the Law for Determining Competency to
Stand Trial in Juvenile Court (JC)
States with no Formal Position Identified (20):
AL, AK, HI, ID, KY, MA,
MS, MO, MT, NE, NH, NJ, ND,
OK, OR, PA, RI, SD, TN, UT
States Applying Dusky/Criminal Court Statute to JC (13):
Via JC Statute: AR, ME, NC
Via Adult Court Statute: SC, WV
Via Case Law: DE, IL, IN, IA, MI, NV, OH, WA
Jurisdictions with Relevant JC Statute/Court Rule (18):
Court Rule: CA, CT, MN, VT
Statute: AZ, CO, DC, FL, GA, KS,
LA, MD, NM, NY, TX, VA, WI, WY
The thirteen states that have relied upon Dusky or a criminal court
statute in developing juvenile court standards have not created special
criteria; four states have exceptions. For example, Arkansas law requires
Dusky-level abilities and also a reliable episodic memory, the ability to
think into the future and consider the impact of behavior, and verbal
articulation and logical decision-making abilities.22 Importantly, however,
these capabilities are required only of defendants who are under the age of
thirteen and who are charged with capital or first degree murder. Although
these youths are prosecuted in juvenile court, failure to respond to the
state's rehabilitation efforts can result in a life sentence.
Other exceptions include a recent ruling from the Iowa Court of
Appeals that immaturity and intellectual capacity can lead to a finding of
incompetency to stand trial,23 and an opinion from the Michigan Court of
Appeals that "competency evaluations should be made in light of juvenile,
rather than adult, norms." 4 Similarly, Ohio appellate courts refer to the
adult statute on competency to stand trial as applying to juvenile court,
provided that "juvenile norms" are utilized.25  These rulings appear to
22 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-502(b)(7)(C)(ix)(b)(l).
23 See In reA.B., 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 189, at * 10-11.
24 In re Carey, 615 N.W.2d at 748.
25 See, e.g., In re Bailey, 782 N.E.2d 1177, 1179 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); In re York, 756
N.E.2d 191, 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
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permit a "watering down" of Dusky standards for defendants in juvenile
court.
The eighteen jurisdictions that have a statute or court rule for juvenile
court tend to hold that competency to stand trial requires only an ability to
understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. For example, Virginia's
statute provides:
If the juvenile is otherwise able to understand the charges against him and assist in
his defense, a finding of incompetency shall not be made based solely on any or all of
the following: (i) the juvenile's age or developmental factors; (ii) the juvenile's claim
to be unable to remember the time period surrounding the alleged offense, or (iii) the
fact that the juvenile is under the influence of medication.
2 6
The only special consideration for juveniles among these jurisdictions
can be found in four states. Florida's and Maryland's competency laws
include a capacity to appreciate the charges, range of penalties, and
adversarial nature of the process; to disclose pertinent facts to counsel; to
display appropriate courtroom behavior; and to testify relevantly.21
Louisiana holds that incompetency to stand trial can stem from
immaturity.28  Vermont's juvenile court rule mentions age and
developmental maturity, mental illness, developmental disorders, any other
disability, and "any other factor" that could affect competency in juvenile
court.29
Most of the law related to competency to stand trial in juvenile court
addresses the mental illness or mental retardation connection to competency
(and treatment prognosis and restoration services) 30 and what should be
done with defendants who are incompetent to stand trial.31
26 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356(F). In addition, Arizona law states that age alone does not
render a person incompetent. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291(2).
27 FLA. STAT. ANN. 985.19(1)(f) (West Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JLJD. PROC.
3-8A-1 7.3(a)(3)(ii) (LexisNexis 2006).
28 See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 837(D) (2004 & Supp. 2009). Similarly, New Mexico
statutes mention that incompetency can stem from mental illness or developmental disability,
but the statute does not articulate any special capabilities required of juvenile defendants.
See N.M. STAT. 32A-2-21(A) (2008).
29 R. FAM. P. l(i). The inspiration for the rule was In re JM., 769 A.2d 656 (Vt. 2001).
30 Juvenile court law that evidences a strong concern for identifying the mental illness,
disease, or defect cause of incompetency and the specific treatment plan needed for
restoration of the defendant includes ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291.07 (2007); CAL. FAM. &
Juv. R. 5.645(a); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(b)(3)(B) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-152 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2348(a) (Supp. 2007); LA.
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 835(c) (Supp. 2009); MINN. R. Juv. DELINQ. P. 20.01(l)(B).(3) (D);
N.M. STAT, § 32A-2-21(A) (2008); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 322.2(5) (McKinney 2008);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.3 1(b) (Vernon 2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-219(c) (2007).
Interestingly, the Arizona Court of Appeals recently held that mental disease, defect, or
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C. MENTALLY CHALLENGED DEFENDANTS FOUND COMPETENT TO
STAND TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT
The profile of defendants deemed competent to stand trial in juvenile
court mirrors the case law pertaining to adult defendants. A juvenile in
Texas underwent preliminary testing that revealed an IQ of 49. A
psychiatrist determined the youth's ability to learn new facts, information,
and routines was more like someone with an IQ in the 80-90 range, and the
youth was ultimately found competent to stand trial.32 Another Texas youth
suffered from mental illness, suicidal ideations, and hallucinations. Despite
these handicaps, the youth was able to understand the delinquent conduct
alleged, the consequences of being adjudicated, and the results of waiving
trial via a guilty plea; he actively participated in his defense and was
declared fit by the juvenile court judge and the Texas appellate court.3 3
Another Texas juvenile found competent to stand trial suffered from head
trauma, Tourette syndrome, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD), and borderline intellectual functioning or mild mental
retardation.34
A fifteen-year-old boy from Minnesota scored in the low average
category in performance, while his verbal IQ actually fell in the
intellectually deficient range.3 5 He was described as having "very limited
verbal memory, poor verbal abstraction abilities, minimal verbal reasoning
and a marginal vocabulary., 36 The youth was limited in his communication
and slow in responding to questions. 37 Nevertheless, he understood the
roles of the court participants, his relationship to defense counsel, the nature
of the trial process, and what his attorney had told him regarding his case.38
His trial went forward.
In another case, a fourteen-year-old mentally retarded youth in
Vermont understood the charges against him and the conditions of his
release, knew who his attorney was, that the judge would decide guilt, and
disability is not required for a finding of incompetency in juvenile court. See In re Hyrum
H., 131 P.3d 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
"1 See infra Part VI.
32 In re L.D.M., No. 05-95-01264-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2127 (Ct. App. Apr. 23,
1997).
31 In re J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003).
14 In re A.D.V., No. 03-99-00020-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9505 (Ct. App. Dec. 23,
1999).
35 In re Welfare of D.D.N., 582 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
36 Id.
37 Id.
31 Id. at 282.
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that he could be incarcerated. 39 He also could communicate his version of
the alleged incident and had a rudimentary understanding of the plea
bargaining process.40  He was declared marginally competent with
assistance.41
A Wisconsin case involved a ten-year-old child who had ADHD and
42was of average intelligence. A defense psychiatrist testified that the youth
lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist in his
defense.43 The expert reported that due to the ADHD and immaturity, the
youth "did lack in his depth of understanding concepts" and "lacked the
ability to fully consider the charges and the meaning associated with long-
term consequences." 44 Thus, there were serious limitations in his ability to
assist in his own defense.45 However, the juvenile was able to define
witness and prosecutor and to identify the punishments he was facing. 6 He
said he could explain to counsel the conduct that brought him to court and
to identify untruthful testimony.47 He was found competent to stand trial.48
Ohio appellate cases include a youth diagnosed with ADHD, bipolar 1I
disorder, expressive language disorder, and cognitive disorder;4 9 a fifteen-
year-old functioning with mild mental retardation and operating at a mental
age of ten years; 50 another with a history of mental illness, various mental
health treatment and a long-standing history of bipolar disorder,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type;51 and a twelve-year-old with bipolar
disorder and ADHD.5 2  This last defendant had an IQ of 63 and had
experienced three emergency psychiatric hospitalizations, one of which
followed an attempted suicide.
5 3
" In re J.M,, 769 A.2d 656, 660 (Vt. 2001).
41 Id. at 660-61.
41 Id. at 661.
42 In re Jacob M.W., 690 N.W.2d 886, 2004 WL 2452567, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)
(unpublished table decision).
41 Id. at *7.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at *8.
47 Id.
41 Id. at *10.
49 In re Anderson, No. 2001AP030021, 2002 WL 253855 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2002).
50 In re Smith, No. 5-01-34, 2002 WL 255126 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2002); see also In
re Stone, No. CA2002-09-035, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2754 (Ct. App. June 16, 2003).
51 In re Gooch, No. 19339, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 6650 (Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002).
52 In re J.J., No. 21386, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 1286, at *13 (Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2004)
(Carr, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at *21.
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Finally, a fourteen-year-old from Delaware was in ninth grade
although his abilities in spelling, reading comprehension, reading decoding,
and arithmetic were scored at the second grade level, while his written
expression was assessed to be at the kindergarten level.54 He had a full
scale IQ of 67 and was classified as mildly mentally retarded." A
psychologist found the youth had "scored extremely low on the ability to
communicate effectively, care for himself, direct himself or function
academically. ' '56 This defendant was found competent to stand trial because
the defense attorney would coach the youth and offer explanations during
numerous recesses in the trial."
D. PROVISIONS FOR DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPETENT TO STAND
TRIAL IN JUVENILE COURT
The majority of statutory and court rule activity concerning
competency to stand trial in juvenile court has involved what happens when
a youth is declared incompetent. Some states have time limits for restoring
the defendant to competency, ranging from 240 days in Arizona, to one year
in New Mexico and Wisconsin, to eighteen months in Iowa, to two years in
Florida.58 Similarly, some states have focused on how long the charges can
remain viable while a youth is incompetent to stand trial; this can depend on
the severity of the offense.59
In order to restore the youth to competency, numerous states provide
for and may demand temporary civil commitment.6 ° Case law in five states
54 State v. J.S., No. 0312013339, 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 75, at *3 (Fam. Ct. Aug. 2,
2005).
51 Id. at *4.
56 Id. at *5.
17 Id. at *4-9.
58 ARIz. REV STAT. ANN. § 8-291.10(G), (H) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19(5)(a)
(West Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-21(G) (2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.30(5)(e)(1)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2008); In re A.B., No. 5-791/05-0868, 2006 Iowa App. LEXIS 189 (Ct.
App. Mar. 1, 2006).
59 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-1303(3)(C) (2008); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(C)(2)
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-155(h) (West 2007); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-17.9(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2006); MINN. R. JUV. DELINQ. P.
20.01(7); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-358 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.30(e)(1).
60 Statutory law or court rules permit or command civil commitment in order to restore
juvenile defendants to competency in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-
291.09 (2007); CAL. FAM. & Juv. R. 5.645(b), (c); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-1302 (2008);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(c)(8) (LexisNexis 2005 & 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-155;
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 835(B)(3) (Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 3318(1)(A), (B) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-17.6 (LexisNexis
2006); N.M. STAT. § 32A-6-13(K) (2008); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 322.2(4), (5)
(McKinney 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.33(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2008); VA. CODE ANN.
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has granted judges permission to impose civil commitment for restoration
of competency.6' Some states have identified a time limit for this
commitment, ranging from 60 days in Minnesota and New Mexico to 90
days in Texas and Virginia to 120 days in Kansas to 360 days in the District
of Columbia.62 Florida law prohibits commitment to its state agency for
children (the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)) if the
basis for the incompetency is age or immaturity; instead, a referral to a
community treatment center is provided.63 Similarly, an Arizona court
recently explained:
The analog to "restoration" in the case of a normal child who is too young to
understand the proceedings would be to either allow the juvenile to mature naturally to
the point where he becomes competent or subject him to special education in the legal
process to try to speed the process of rendering him competent .... 64
If restoration appears impossible, some states allow the judge to
dismiss the petition with or without prejudice; some states have restricted
the "with prejudice" to misdemeanors and status offenses.65  Three states
permit the judge to convert some delinquency charges into status offenses,
§ 16.1-357(A)-(B) (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.295(2)(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-219(a) (2007). Florida law requires commitment if the
youth is mentally ill or retarded and a felony is involved. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19(2)
(Supp. 2008). Similarly, New York says residential treatment can be mandated if the youth
has been charged with a designated felony. See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 322.2(5)(c).
Nebraska statutes allow a thirty-day placement for evaluation of the defendant's competency
to stand trial, but do not specify limits to commitment for restoration purposes. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-258(2) (2004).
61 See, e.g., James H. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1978); In re K.G.,
808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 2004); People ex rel. Thorpe v. Clark, 403 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div.
1978); In re D.G., 698 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Juv. Div. 1998); Bettelyoun v.
Talbott, 286 N.W.2d 526 (S.D. 1979).
62 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2315(C)(7)(A) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); KAN.
STAT. ANN. 38-2348(b)(2) (Supp. 2007); MINN. R. Juv. DELINQ. P. 20.01(3)(C); N.M. STAT.
§ 32A-6-13(K) (2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.33(a)(1)(A)-(B); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
357(A)-(B) (2008). The Virginia statute also allows extensions of the commitment for
additional three-month periods. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-357(A)-(B). The Maine statute says
the defendant can remain committed until no longer mentally ill. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 3318 (1)(A)-(B).
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19(l)(C)(2).
64 In re Charles B., 978 P.2d 659, 661 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).
65 Dismissing petitions is possible in several jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-291.08(D) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-1303(3)(c) (2008); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-2315(c)(8) (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19(5)(c); GA.
CODE ANN. § 15-11-155(d); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 837(C), (D) (2008 & Supp. 2009);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-17.7, 17.9 0; MINN. R. JUv. DELINQ. P.
20.01(5)(B), (7)(B); N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-2 I(G) (2008); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 322.2(4)
(McKinney 2008); VT. R. FAM. P. 1(i)(7); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-358 (LexisNexis 2008);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-219(d).
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66but another four require competency to stand trial in all cases. Some
jurisdictions allow the civil commitment of youths who are permanently
incompetent to stand trial.67
E. DUSKY AND JUVENILE DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURT
Several appellate court cases have applied Dusky to juvenile
defendants in criminal court without creating special interpretations for
these youths.68 For example, a fifteen-year-old was found competent to
stand trial in Minnesota despite falling into trance or dissociative states
during jury selection. 69 A sixteen-year-old in Alabama had an IQ of 76, and
the defense psychologist had testified that the youth had a mental age of
twelve years and a third grade reading ability. 70 Nevertheless, the juvenile
understood the charges, legal strategies, and possible punishments.71
A lower Alabama court upheld the criminal prosecution of a fifteen-
year-old who had an IQ score of 48, but was capable of behaving in an
appropriate manner when it was beneficial to him. 2 The psychologist who
declared the youth was competent to stand trial testified that the IQ score
did not reflect the youth's true potential, and that individuals with little
66 For states that allow incompetent delinquents to be adjudicated status offenders, see
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-502(b)(9)(C) (2008); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 837(B)(2) (Supp.
2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. 938.30(5)(d) (2000 & Supp. 2008). For states that require
competency to stand trial for all juvenile defendants, see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 8-291.01A;
CAL. FAM. & Juv. R. 5.645; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-152(a) (West 2007); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. 55.3 1(a). Georgia does not allow an incompetent-to-stand trial defendant in juvenile
court to be adjudicated a delinquent or status offender, but a youth so charged can be
declared a dependent. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-153(e) (West 2007).
67 Civil commitment is suggested or demanded for youths permanently regarded IST in
several jurisdictions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-291.08(D); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
2315(C)(8); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.19(5)(C); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-155(d); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-2349(c) (Supp. 2007); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 837.3(C) (Supp. 2009); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. P. § 3-8A-17.7(a); MINN. R. Juv. DELNQ. P. 20.01(5)(B)(1); N.M.
STAT. 32A-2-21(G); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 55.37-.42; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-358; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 938.30(5)(d) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-219(c)-(d).
Appellate case law has reached the same conclusion in California and Indiana. See James H.
v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1978); In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631 (Ind.
2004).
68 See, e.g., Mullinax v. State, 440 S.E.2d 720 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Dillard, 718
P.2d 1272 (Idaho 1986); Lockridge v. State, 338 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1975); State v. Kempf,
282 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1979); State v. Lewis, 556 P.2d 888 (Kan. 1976); Hayden v.
Commonwealth, 563 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1978): Humphrey v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-CA-
000906, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 147 (Ct. App. May 21, 2004).
69 State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1998).
70 Brown v. State, 540 So. 2d 740, 742-43 (Ala. 1989).
71 Id. at 742.
72 M.D. v. State, 701 So. 2d 58, 61 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
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formal education typically achieve scores that underestimate their true
abilities.73 A second psychologist described the defendant as between slow
learner and mildly retarded (an IQ between 60 and 70), but as severely
academically retarded.74  Although the youth was also emotionally
immature and impulsive, the psychologist concluded the youth could aid in
his own defense and was competent to stand trial.75
In other cases from around the country, a seventeen-year-old Arizona
youth was found by three psychologists to have a schizoid personality, but
was able to make competent choices.76 The three experts agreed the
defendant was competent to waive his right to trial.77
A fourteen-year-old Illinois youth had below average intelligence and
had sniffed glue.78 He understood the charges and cooperated with
defense.79 At the beginning of the proceedings, he did not comprehend his
right to jury trial and the concept of waiving that right, but his attorney and
parents educated him to the point that he was found competent to stand
trial."0
A thirteen-year-old Nebraska youth had been found by a psychologist
to have a persistent preoccupation with death, violence, and other morbid
content. 8  He was emotionally detached and escaped into fantasy when
faced with stressful situations. 82 Nevertheless, he was determined to be
competent to stand trial.83
A sixteen-year-old in Oklahoma suffering from hallucinations and
depression was found competent to stand trial.84 Another sixteen-year-old,
in Pennsylvania, was diagnosed as schizophrenic with a schizoid
personality.85 He was able to understand the proceedings and assist
counsel, and was declared competent to stand trial.86
73 Id.
74 Id. at 62.
75 Id.
76 State v. Thompson, 545 P.2d 925, 926 (Ariz. 1976).
" Id. at 926-27.
78 People v. Hammond, 259 N.E.2d 44,47 (Ill. 1970).
79 Id. at 48.
80 id.
81 State v. McCracken, 615 N.W.2d 902, 911 (Neb. 2000).
82 id.
83 id.
84 Mooney v. State, 990 P.2d 875, 881-82 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
85 Commonwealth v. Hughes, 555 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Pa. 1989).
86 Id. at 1269.
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In Tennessee, a fifteen-year-old had an adjustment disorder, conduct
disorder, and alcohol and cannabis abuse in his past.87 He was also
diagnosed with a brief psychotic disorder with marked stressors. He had
had two beers the night of the offense and could not remember parts of the
night prior to his arrest, yet he, too, was declared competent to stand trial.89
III. THE ADVOCACY: MILITATING TO PREVENT THE PROSECUTION OF
JUVENILES IN CRIMINAL COURT
The question of juveniles' competency to stand trial has been raised in
response to the fact that many more prosecutions of juvenile offenders
occur in criminal court today than they did twenty to thirty years ago. 9°
Historically, the competency question would not have been raised in
juvenile court because trials were rare there before In re Gault. Youths'
incompetency to stand trial would have been considered a valid reason to
adjudicate them so as to offer treatment.
Since the very first days of juvenile court's existence, it has been
possible to transfer serious and chronic juvenile offenders to criminal court.
Historically, the juvenile court judge made this decision. 91 A significant
increase in violent juvenile crime twenty years ago led legislatures in nearly
all states to expand the potential of excluding offenders from juvenile court.
Particularly troublesome to opponents of exclusion is the legislation that
allocated greater transfer decision-making power to prosecutors.92
For decades there have been challenges to idea of exclusion, but they
did not involve juveniles' competency to stand trial in criminal court. It is
the recently increased presence of juvenile defendants in criminal court that
has spurred the inquiry into their competency to stand trial. Despite
competency's limited requirements, the literature is being inundated with
claims that adolescents en masse are incompetent to stand trial, especially-
and perhaps only-if the trial occurs in criminal court.
These claims have been offered principally by developmental
psychologists (DPs) who have employed developmental psychology
87 State v. Sexton, No. E2000-01779-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 651,
at *28 (Crim. App. Aug. 2, 2002).
88 id.
89 Id.
90 See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Public Attitudes About the Culpability and Punishment of
Young Offenders, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 815, 816 (2006).
91 See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out of the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 13 (Jeffery Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
92 See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Policies Regarding the Prosecution of Juvenile Murderers:
Which System and Who Should Decide?, 18 LAW & POL'Y 151 (1996).
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principles and research methods to support their claims. 93 Although they
are not the only observers who oppose prosecuting juveniles in criminal
court, the DPs have selected a line of reasoning that lies within their
discipline. They claim that adolescents lack the maturity of judgment to be
competent to stand trial, arguing that adolescents are less mature than adults
due to deficiencies in maturity of judgment which render it impossible for
adolescents to competently participate in a criminal court trial.
94
A. THE CASE FOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIVE INCOMPETENCY (JAI)
DPs have constructed two maturity-of-judgment models that purport to
explain why juveniles are incompetent to stand trial in criminal courts. The
two models, both of which emerged in 1995, identify three psychosocial
factors that share common elements.
The first model, proposed by Cauffman and Steinberg, contains the
factors of "responsibility, temperance, and perspective." 95 Responsibility
pertains to the ability to be self-reliant, and to enjoy clarity of identity and
healthy autonomy.96  Temperance involves one's ability to limit
impulsivity, to avoid extremes, and to evaluate situations before acting.
97
Perspective relates to one's ability to understand the complexity of a
situation and place it in a broader context.98
Scott, Reppucci, and Woolard developed the second model, which
addresses the factors of "conformity, risk perception, and temporal
perspective." 99 Conformity pertains to one's susceptibility to influence or
tendency to comply with peers and parents.100 Risk perception involves just
that, in addition to attitudes toward risk and a tendency to focus more on the
93 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso & Laurence Steinberg, Between a Rock and a Soft Place:
Developmental Research and the Child Advocacy Process, 34 J. CLINICAL CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 619 (2005).
94 Legal experts and some from other disciplines have joined the ranks of the
developmental psychologists in opposing excluding juveniles from juvenile court for the
reasons cited by the psychologists. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, this Article
lumps all of those who focus on the incompetency aspect in opposing exclusion together as
developmental psychologists. Although maturity of judgment involves both competency to
stand trial and juvenile offenders' culpability, this Article considers only the competency
issue.
95 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on
Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1763, 1773 (1995).96 Id. at 1774-80.
97 Id. at 1778-83.
98 Id. at 1783-87.
99 See Elizabeth S. Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard, Evaluating
Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 221, 229 (1995).
10 Id. at 299-30.
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possibility of gains than losses. 10 1  Temporal perspective relates to the
ability to consider both long and short term implications of behaviors, and
to make decisions without being influenced by external pressures.10 2
Adolescents are seen as impulsive and sensation seeking, inclined to
use information less effectively than adults, less experienced, apt to
discount future fear, likely to misread threats, and subject to stress and
mood variations. 10 3  Youths are also seen as being vulnerable to peer
influence, to looking at the short-term rather than to the long-term, and to
reacting to risk by seeing potential gains more than losses.10 4 Adolescents
are also thought to be less capable than adults when it comes to
understanding others' perspectives and differing points of view. 10 5 These
traits mean that adolescents cannot be as competent as adults due to
possibly making "different choices when faced with decisions in legal
contexts."
106
Adolescents' lack of maturity vis-A-vis adults can lead to thinking,
understanding, and behaving much differently than mature individuals in a
criminal prosecution. These differences, in turn, are theorized to render
adolescents generally incompetent defendants. DPs have theorized that,
compared to adult defendants, juvenile defendants may:
(1) perceive and calculate the probability of risk differently in that they
are more likely to underestimate the likelihood of risks or to undervalue
their negative implications;'
0 7
(2) be less aware of-and less alert to-information, or to use what
information they have less effectively in making choices; 
108
(3) fixate on an initial possibility in the decision-making process and
fail to adjust as new information becomes available; 0 9
01 Id. at 230-31.
102 Id. at 231-32.
103 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. &
POL'YREv. 143, 153-56 (2003).
104 See Scott, Reppucci & Woolard, supra note 99.
105 See Randy K. Otto & Alan M. Goldstein, Juveniles' Competence to Confess and
Competence to Participate in the Juvenile Justice Process, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 179 (Kirk Heilbrun et al. eds., 2005).
106 Jennifer Lee Woolard, Developmental Aspects of Judgment and Competence in
Legally Relevant Contexts 12 (May 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia) (on file with Proquest).
107 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: New Questions for an Era of
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: RETHINKING ASSESSMENT,
COMPETENCY AND SENTENCING FOR A HARSHER ERA OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 32 (Patricia
Puritz et al. eds., 1997); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 103, at 144.
108 See Grisso, supra note 107, at 32.
109 See id.
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(4) experience difficulty in contemplating the meaning of a
consequence, particularly a long-term one, and have less capacity to
anticipate harm as an unintended result of their actions; 0
(5) have less experience to draw on; il1
(6) make choices that they would not make when their values and
sense of personal identity have matured;' 12 and
(7) make different legal decisions than adults and not be as able to
resist the influence of others to change their mind.
1 3
DPs tell us that, as defendants, adolescents may be expected to:
(1) misinterpret the role of counsel and think that they must be truthful
with their attorney so the latter will decide whether to advocate for the
defendant's interests;'
14
(2) distrust defense counsel and not be forthcoming with that person
due to a belief that adult defense attorneys would not work for a juvenile
the way they would for adults; 15
(3) overestimate the probability of desired events that may result in a
greater likelihood of rejecting plea bargains; 1 6 and
(4) have difficulty comprehending the significance of the length of
sentences, which can interfere with an ability to appreciate the
consequences of various dispositions and to make informed legally-relevant
decisions. 117
B. GENERAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS ON JUVENILES' LEGAL
ABILITIES
A good deal of research has explored juveniles' capabilities, frequently
in legally-oriented contexts, without examining trial competency per se. In
110 See id.
1 ' See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to
Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 26
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
112 See Grisso, supra note 107, at 32; Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution
of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997); Laurence Steinberg et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial
as Adults, 17 SoC. POL'Y REP. 3 (2003).
113 See Steinberg et al., supra note 112, at 4.
114 Grisso, supra note 107, at 31.
115 See Emily Buss, "You're My What? ": The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of
Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1996); Naomi E. Goldstein et al.,
Advocating a Functional Approach to Determining Adjudicative Competency in Juveniles, 2
J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 89, 93 (2002).
116 Goldstein et al., supra note 115, at 93.
117 Id.
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1980, Melton found that most children had some idea of the nature of rights
by the third grade, while most understood a right as a guaranteed
entitlement by age fourteen. 118 Grisso reported the next year that as many
thirteen-year-olds (80-90%) understood that a defense attorney serves as an
advocate or helper as did older teens and adults.1 19 Later, two other studies
documented the legal abilities of youths. Warren-Leubecker, Tate, Hinton,
and Ozbek discovered that by the age of eight, 92% knew that a judge is in
charge of the courtroom, and 90% of thirteen-year-olds understood that
jurors decide whether a person is guilty or not guilty based on what they
hear in court. 120 Saywitz determined that youths had accurate concepts of a
court and the roles of judges, witnesses, and attorneys by the age of eight to
nine years. 21 For eight- to eleven-year-olds, 93% gave accurate responses
for the roles of the judge and lawyer, while 86% understood witnesses; for
twelve- to fourteen-year-olds, 91% gave accurate responses concerning the
judge, and 100% were on mark with both witnesses and lawyers. 122
These results parallel the findings of numerous studies that have found
few differences between adolescents and adults in formal decision-making
abilities.'23 The conclusions reached in several studies is that by age
fourteen or fifteen, little distinguishes adolescents from adults in the
cognitive-capacity aspect of decision-making. 124 This considerable body of
118 See Gary B. Melton, Children's Concepts of Their Rights, 9 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PSYCHOL. 186 (1980).
119 See generally THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Richard A. Lawrence, The Role of Legal Counsel in
Juveniles' Understanding of Their Rights, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Winter 1983, at 49, 52
(1984).
120 See Amye Warren-Leubecker et al., What Do Children Know About the Legal System
and When Do They Know It? First Steps Down a Less Traveled Path in Child Witness
Research, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 158 (S.J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989).
121 Karen J. Saywitz, Children 's Conceptions of the Legal System: "Court Is a Place to
Play Basketball, " in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY, supra note 120, at 131.
122 Id. at 145.
123 See, e.g., Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129
(1992); Ellen Greenberg Garrison, Children's Competence to Participate in Divorce Custody
Decisionmaking, 20 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 78 (1991); Catherine C. Lewis, A
Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446
(1980); David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise Voluntariness in Medical
Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAM. 431 (1991); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B.
Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment
Decisions, 53 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1589 (1982).
124 See, e.g., Ruth Beyth-Marom et al., Perceived Consequences of Risky Behaviors:
Adults and Adolescents, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 549 (1993); Lita Furby & Ruth
Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1 (1992); Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors Consent to
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literature has led Professor Grisso to declare that "formal reasoning or
problem-solving abilities continue to improve through adolescence, but
normatively they may not be substantively different from adults' abilities
after age fourteen or fifteen ....
Other conclusions drawn by Professor Grisso, prior to the recent
onslaught of research on juveniles' competency to stand trial, include the
following:
(1) By age thirteen, most juveniles accurately identify trial participants
and their roles, as well as the purposes of trial and that as defendants they
are charged with offenses and are facing punitive consequences. 126
(2) By age fourteen, there are few differences vis-d-vis adults in
understanding trial-related matters, 127 and some will have the same abilities
related to competency to stand trial as adults.1
28
(3) By age fifteen, juveniles are as capable as adults in providing
information to attorneys from their experiences, 129 they can track the trial
process as it unfolds and can relate one event to another later one (as in
contradictory testimony), 30 and they begin to develop the ability to think in
terms of hypothetical conditions.'
3
'
C. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUVENILES' COMPENTENCY TO STAND
TRIAL
The first study focused specifically on juveniles' competency to stand
trial was conducted by Savitsky and Karras in 1984.132 They used the
Competency Screening Test, which gauges knowledge of legal items.
There are no instructions provided and no way to ascertain whether the test-
taker is ignorant of court-related facts or cannot comprehend what a
criminal trial is all about even after an explanation. Savitsky and Karras
administered the test to three groups of individuals: twelve nonincarcerated
Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 412 (1978); Leon
Mann et al., Adolescent Decision-Making: The Development of Competence, 12 J.
ADOLESCENCE 265 (1989); Lois A. Weithorn, Involving Children in Decisions Affecting
Their Own Welfare: Guidelines for Professionals, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT
235 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
125 Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 111, at 139.
126 Id. at 146; Grisso, supra note 107, at 29.
127 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 112, at 169.
128 See Grisso, supra note 107, at 33.
129 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 112, at 167.
130 See id. at 156; Grisso, supra note 107, at 31.
131 See Grisso, supra note 107, at 32.
132 Jeffrey C. Savitsky & Deborah Karras, Competency to Stand Trial Among
Adolescents, 19 ADOLESCENCE 349 (1984).
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twelve-year-olds; eighty fifteen to seventeen-year-olds, one half of whom
were incarcerated; and nineteen adults. 133 The researchers found that the
mean scores on the test improved with each age group.' 34  However,
Savitsky and Karras could form no conclusions on the percentage of the
sample's three groups that was competent to stand trial. 3 '
Cowden and McKee reviewed 136 South Carolina juveniles between
the ages of nine and sixteen who had been referred for a competency
evaluation between January 1987 and January 1994.136 Competency to
stand trial was correlated with age, previous severe mental health diagnosis,
and remedial education.137 No correlation was discovered for gender, race,
number or severity of charges, mental health services history, or juvenile
court history. 138  The majority of thirteen- (55.6%), fourteen- (67.7%),
fifteen- (84.4%), and sixteen-year-olds (72%) were found competent to
stand trial; only a minority of eleven- (18.2%) and twelve-year-olds
(27.3%) were competent to stand trial, however. 139  The fifteen- and
sixteen-year-olds found incompetent to stand trial suffered from mental
illness or mental retardation.
40
McKee later examined another sample of 108 juvenile defendants
between the ages of seven and sixteen referred for a competency evaluation
between January 1994 and June 1996; 85.2% of the juveniles were deemed
competent to stand trial.' 41 Adults and those between ages thirteen and
sixteen displayed a better understanding of the charges, court procedure,
and how to assist an attorney than did youths younger than thirteen.
Although seventeen-year-olds were not counted among them, juveniles as a
group outperformed adults on several dimensions of the evaluation
(knowing and defining charges, court officers, and the adversarial nature of
the court; appropriate court behavior; testifying and challenging witnesses;
and disclosing facts to the attorney), while fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds
I d. at 353.
134 Id. at 355.
' Id. at 355-57.
136 Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 J.
FAM. L. 629, 648 (1995).
131 Id. at 652-54.
131 Id. at 654-55.
139 Id. at 652.
140 Id. at 657.
141 Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicatory Juveniles and
Adults, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 91 (1998).
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were considered equal to adults in terms of competency to stand trial,
except in their knowledge of plea bargaining.1
42
The same sample (with four more juveniles referred for a competency
evaluation between July 1996 and January 1997) was reexamined by
McKee and Shea; 85.7% of the juveniles were considered competent to
stand trial.' 43  Only age, intelligence, and prior juvenile arrest were
significantly related to clinical opinions of juveniles' competency to stand
trial. 144  Severity of mental health diagnosis and history of remedial
education were not found to be associated with incompetency to stand
trial. 145 Competent youths were older, less likely to be mentally retarded,
and more likely to have had prior juvenile court experience. 146
Cooper's dissertation targeted 112 juveniles between the ages of
eleven and sixteen who had been placed at the South Carolina Department
of Juvenile Justice Reception and Evaluation Center after having been
adjudicated delinquent. 147  Cooper administered the Georgia Court
Competency Test (GCCT) for which she created a "juvenile version"
(GCCT-JR). Cooper hypothesized that all thirteen-year-olds, a majority of
fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds, and one-half of the sixteen-year-olds would
be incompetent to stand trial even though all had been prosecuted.
148
Cooper believed that restoration training would assist older, but not
younger, members of her sample; the research called for a training session
for all those initially found incompetent to stand trial. 149
Cooper added six "critical" questions and required accurate responses
to all six to be found competent to stand trial, even if the youth surpassed
the cut-off score on the GCCT. 5 ° The six critical questions are confusing.
One asks: when a prosecutor offers a plea bargain, does that mean the
prosecutor is "for" or "against" the defendant? 15' All of the youths had
already been found delinquent; 152 many likely had plea bargained their
142 Id. at 94-95.
143 Geoffrey R. McKee & Steven J. Shea, Competency to Stand Trial in Family Court:
Characteristics of Competent and Incompetent Juveniles, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
65, 67, 69 (1999).
'44 Id. at 69-70.
141 Id. at 71.
146 Id. at 69-70.
147 Deborah Kay Cooper, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: The Effects of Age and
Presentation of Factual Information in the Attainment of Competency in Juveniles (1995)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with author).
148 Id. at 25, 44.
141 Id. at 42-44.
"0o Id. at 41.
'1 Id. at 99.
152 Id. at 26.
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cases. It is possible that many were told by their attorneys that the
prosecutor had done them a favor and that sentencing would be more
lenient due to the youth's cooperation. Another question asks: when the
public defender reveals that the youth will probably be committed to a
juvenile facility, does this mean the attorney is "for" or "against" the
defendant? 153 Adjudicated juveniles might not be convinced that the public
defender actually worked to avoid commitment. A third question asks
whether it is okay to tell the public defender when there is a lack of
understanding of what is happening or what people are saying in court.'54
Although this question seems straightforward, the training protocol made it
very confusing as to whether youths should talk or remain silent. 55 Finally,
youths were told:
The judge knows how many times you've been in trouble before and what they said
you did each time, and what happened to you each time .... If you've been in
trouble before, the judge holds this against you. So each time you get in trouble, the
judge will get harsher and harsher with you.
The training protocol is not clear that this judicial knowledge refers to
sentencing. only. Juveniles could be confused, then, when asked two of
Cooper's critical questions: "When you have to go to court, does the judge
know if you have ever been in trouble before?"; "Does the judge think
about whether you have ever been in trouble before when s/he decides what
is going to happen to you?'1 7 Juveniles who are thinking of trial will
receive zero points by answering no or sometimes instead of an unequivocal
158
yes.
Two of the 112 youths were determined to be competent to stand trial,
which made them ineligible; incompetent to stand trial findings were
necessary for the study to occur. 159 Total score at the initial testing period
correlated significantly with race, IQ, and sibling history in criminal
activity. 160 Thirteen-year-olds had significantly lower scores than the other
three age groups at the pretest, but not at the posttest. 16' There were no
significant differences among fourteen-, fifteen-, and sixteen-year-olds at
either the pre- or posttest. 162  Mean scores for all age groups rose
153 Id.
154 Id. at 101.
' See id. at 116.
156 Id. at 42-44.
157 Id. at 100.
158 Id.
9 Id. at 47.
160 Id. at 48-49.
161 Id. at 49.
162 Id. at 50.
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considerably from the pre- to the post-test period, indicating some success
for the restoration training. 1
63
Schnyder's dissertation examined 163 males, the majority of whom
were between thirteen and nineteen years of age.' 64 All had been found
guilty and incarcerated. Seventy percent of the respondents were black,
while the rest were white. 165 Schnyder examined defendants' trust in and
understanding of the role of defense counsel and the relationship among
these elements, one's age, and competency. She developed four
hypotheses: (1) younger defendants would have less trust in their attorneys,
in people, and in authority; (2) younger age would be related to a poorer
understanding of the role of defense counsel and a lower trust in the defense
attorney; (3) less trust in the attorney would mean one is less likely to be
assessed competent; and (4) competency to stand trial scores would be
correlated with age. 1
66
Schnyder employed numerous measures, including borrowing
Cooper's juvenile adaptation of the GCCT and creating a Trust in My
Lawyer Scale and an Understanding About Lawyers Scale specifically for
this research. 167 In addition, Schnyder used the Alienation Scale of the
Jesness Inventory to ascertain distrust in relationships, and had the sample
respond to statements connected to doubt about trustworthiness of
people. 168  Finally, the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT) was
utilized to determine verbal and non-verbal IQ.
169
Schnyder rejected her first hypothesis. Age was not related to trust in
one's lawyer, other people, or authority figures. 170  Age was related to
understanding the attorney's role; younger individuals had a poorer
understanding, but the correlation was not significant. A poorer
understanding in counsel's role was significantly correlated with lower trust
in the attorney. 171 Less trust in the attorney did mean one was less likely to
be assessed competent. 172 However, Schnyder admitted that answers to the
163 id.
164 See Christine Schnyder, The Competence of Juveniles to Assist in Their Own
Defense: An Investigation of Trust and Understanding in the Attorney Relationship (1998)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama) (on file with author).
165 Id. at 32. One participant self-identified as Native American, but "[h]is data were
excluded from analyses involving Race as a factor." Id.
166 Id. at 50-57.
167 Id. at 36-38.
168 Id. at 42-43.
169 Id. at 43-44.
170 Id. at 50-53.
'7' Id. at 54-57.
172 Id. at 59.
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GCCT-JR may have been influenced more by cynical attitudes than by
cognitive abilities. 73  She acknowledged the confusion in a defense
attorney's role in juvenile court and conceded that "[t]here may be good
reasons for some juveniles to misunderstand and mistrust their
attorneys." 174 She also conceded that some of the participants in her study
"may have had attorneys who were neither competent, [nor]
diligent .... [T]hus, distrust of the attorney was justified."'175 The sample
had been convicted and incarcerated, which may have influenced their
perceptions of counsel's role and ability. Nevertheless, youths' beliefs that
defense attorneys are not dedicated to advocacy, and that they share
confidential information with others, resulted in findings that the youth is
mistrustful of and lacks understanding of counsel's role, and is incompetent
to stand trial.
176
Competency to stand trial scores were significantly related to age.
After eliminating the two twelve-year-olds who averaged a score of 18 in
the GCCT-JR and the one twenty-year-old who had a score of 32, however,
all age groups registered a mean score of either 28 (fourteen-year-olds), 29
(thirteen-year-olds), 30 (fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds) or 31 (seventeen-,
eighteen-, and nineteen-year-olds).177
Schnyder's research disclosed that defendants with court-appointed
lawyers had significantly less trust in their attorneys than did those with
private counsel. 78 While lower-IQ white defendants were less trusting in
their attorneys than higher-IQ whites were, the reverse was true for black
offenders.17 9 Lower-IQ black defendants were more trusting than higher-IQ
blacks.18 0 Overall, black youths were less trusting of their attorneys than
were white youths, but 90% of the defense attorneys were white.'
8 1
Interestingly, higher IQ was significantly related to less trust in others.
Contrary to maturity of judgment theory, neither age nor any other variable
was associated with trust in authority figures. 182  Schnyder found that IQ
was significantly related to competency scores. 
8 3
173 Id. at 89-90.
14 Id. at 21.
' Id. at 88.
176 See id. at 50-59.
177 See id. at 59.
178 Id. at 60.
'9 Id. at 61.
180 Id. at 63.
'~' Id. at 55, 63.
182 Id. at 63, 65.
183 See id. at 65.
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Schnyder assumed that mistrust in an attorney means unwillingness to
cooperate with counsel, which means one would be considered incompetent
to stand trial. 84 Schnyder's study did not investigate willingness to assist
counsel or holding back information from counsel, however. Most
importantly, this study did not ascertain actual mistrust of defense counsel.
Rather, Schnyder examined relative degrees of greater or lesser trust of
counsel.
Krause and Woolard used the same samples for their doctoral
dissertations.' 85 The all-male sample involved: (1) sixty detainees fifteen
years of age and younger, (2) sixty detainees ages sixteen and seventeen,
and (3) sixty-one detainees between the ages of nineteen and thirty-five.8 6
Whereas Krause was examining adjudicative competence, Woolard was
looking at adolescent competence. Both used the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), which ascertains
the individual's abilities in three contexts: Understanding (the roles of
opposing counsel, judge, jury); Reasoning (distinguishing more from less
legally relevant information); and Appreciation (perception of being treated
fairly).'87 The MacCAT-CA has twenty-two items and involves the reading
of a vignette.1
88
Krause also utilized measures of intelligence, temperance, perspective,
risk perception, and emotional functioning to test the maturity of judgment
theory. 189 Krause hypothesized that juveniles would demonstrate deficits in
adjudicative competence, which would be associated with age. 90 Instead,
she found that scores registered by the three age groups in the three contexts
of Understanding (U), Reasoning (R), and Appreciation (A) were similar
and not significantly different.' 91 Krause concluded:
The results of the current study provided no evidence to support either of [the]
hypotheses, as the performance of both juvenile groups on the MacCAT-CA was
remarkably similar to that of the adult sample on all three subscales. Furthermore, the
184 See id. at 75.
185 See Meredith Susanne Krause, Methodological and Developmental Issues in the
Assessment of Adjudicative Competence (May 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Virginia) (on file with author); Woolard, supra note 106.
186 Krause, supra note 185, at 16-18.
187 See MacArthur Research Network on Adolescent Dev. & Juvenile Justice (MacArthur
Research Network), Method, Measures, and Procedures for the Juvenile Adjudicative
Competence Study 9, 16-19 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished working paper), http://www.adjj.org/
downloads/9213methodarchival and tables.pdf.
188 Woolard, supra note 106, at app. A, pp 91-114.
189 See Krause, supra note 185, at 15.
19I d. at 72.
191 Id.
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juveniles' scores were quite similar to those of competent adult detainees included in
the original MacCAT-CA validation study ....192
Krause also found no significant difference by age on sensation
seeking, suppression of aggression, impulse control, responsibility, or time
perspective/future orientation. Krause explained "age did not appear to
contribute significantly to differences in... decisional temperance or risk
perception/sensation seeking."' 93  No significant correlations existed
between MacCAT-CA scores for any age and emotional distress, decisional
temperance, risk perception, and perspective. 194  The only significant
correlation was between perspective and reasoning for adults only. 195 This
correlation supports the developmental theory that reasoning abilities
improve the more one has the ability to consider others' feelings and
reactions. However, younger adolescents nearly equaled, while older
adolescents actually outscored, adults on the reasoning subscale.1
96
The strongest correlation involved IQ, which was significantly
correlated with understanding for all age groups, with reasoning for adults,
and with appreciation for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds. This led Krause
to comment that:
[I]ntelligence alone, and not age or the interaction between age and intelligence,
appears to be contributing to differences in MacCAT-CA performance, especially on
the Understanding and Reasoning Subscales ..... [Krause noted that her] results
suggest that differences in MacCAT-CA Understanding and Reasoning scores can be
attributed to differences in intelligence, regardless of the impact of age or race.197
Krause finally observed:
[T]he results.., indicate that juveniles do not, by nature of their developmental
status alone, possess deficits in adjudicative competence relative to similarly
functioning adults. Indeed, the juveniles included in this study demonstrated a level
of understanding, reasoning, and appreciation that was no different from that of the
adult comparison group .... [T]heir youth alone is not a bar to their ability to possess
"a reasonable degree of rational understanding as well as a factual understanding of
the proceedings" or to "assist in preparing" a defense.
198
Woolard hypothesized that several developmental factors would affect
the decision-making process for juveniles. 199 These factors included "risk
perception, temporal perspective, parent/peer influence, responsibility,
192 id.
9 Id. at 45.
194 Id. at 62, 65, 67.
195 See id. at 75.
196 Id. at 34.
197 Id. at 41. The Appreciation scale was not given to the comparison group.
198 Id. at 78.
199 See Woolard, supra note 106, at 55.
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temperance and perspective.,, °  Her goal "was to clarify the meaning of
adolescent competence as a function of both adult competence factors and
judgment factors. ' 0 ' She utilized a number of measurement instruments,
including the Judgment Assessment Tool-Adolescents/Adults (JATA),
which was developed for this study.20 2 The JATA measured reaction to a
fifteen-year-old accused facing two potential decisions in a criminal justice
context: talking to police and accepting a plea bargain.20 3 Inasmuch as
talking to police occurs long before trial, only the decision of accepting a
plea bargain is related to adjudicative competence.
The participant was asked to report (1) what options were available for
an accused individual when talking to police and accepting a plea bargain
and what he or she would recommend for this suspect, (2) what the
accused's parents or peers would recommend, (3) what the participant
would recommend in light of a parent or peer recommendation that
contradicts the sample's recommendation, and (4) what he or she would do
in a similar situation.20 4 Woolard also examined sensation seeking or risk
proclivity, decisional temperance (as measured via suppression of
aggression and impulse control), responsibility, and optimistic beliefs about
the future.2°5
She found significant age effects on only three maturity of judgment
elements: consideration of others, responsibility, and peer attachment
(particularly among older white adolescents).20 6 Both younger and older
adolescents scored lower than adults on consideration of others. 20 7
Supporting this, Krause had found consideration of others and reasoning
were significantly correlated for adults; however, the sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds in Krause's sample outscored the adults on the
reasoning subscale, while the fifteen and younger group did not score
significantly lower than the adults. The disadvantage that adolescents
would experience due to a lower score on consideration of others is unclear.
Woolard discovered sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds scoring lower than
adults on the responsibility measure, while the fifteen and younger group
finished between the other two groups (and not significantly different from
either). 208 Thus, juveniles do not appear to suffer from being significantly
200 Id.
201 id.
202 Id. at 19.
203 Id. at 19-20.
204 Id. at 20.
205 Id. at 22-24.
206 Id. at 28-29.
207 Id. at 29.
208 See id.
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different from adults in the responsibility category. Moreover, Krause had
found responsibility and reasoning were significantly correlated for adults,
but that the older adolescent group performed better than adults in the
reasoning capacity and the younger adolescents were nearly as capable as
the adults.209
Woolard found adolescents scoring higher than adults on peer
attachment such that they have stronger feelings about their peers. 21° She
did not directly measure peer influence, however, and it is questionable
whether adolescents would have considered their peers had they not been
forced to do so. And, the disadvantage due to peer influence remains
unclear since Woolard found fewer adolescents than adults said their peers
would want them to talk to the police, and more younger adolescents than
older ones and adults (who were tied) said their peers would recommend
that they remain silent at police interrogation. Similarly, there were no
significant differences among the three age groups as to whether they would
accept or refuse a plea bargain offer.21'
Although Woolard's research revealed some differences between the
thinking processes of adolescents and adults, she found no age differences
in parent attachment, impulsivity, suppression of aggression, and degree of
sensation seeking. She concluded:
[T]he stereotypes and research describing greater impulsivity and risk preferences
in adolescents as compared to adults were not supported by these data .... The
theory that adolescents focus more on losses than gains, and short term rather than
long term consequences is not fully supported by the data .... 212
Boyd's dissertation used the MacCAT-CA to assess the competency to
stand trial of eighty-six males between the ages of thirteen and seventeen
detained and awaiting trial in criminal court in North Carolina where the
maximum juvenile court age is fifteen.213 Of the eighty-six, twenty-six
were fifteen and younger (nine were thirteen- or fourteen-years-old), and
thirty each were sixteen and seventeen years old; a comparison group of
thirty eighteen-year-old pretrial inmates was randomly selected from the
validation study of the MacCAT.214 Boyd screened out three adults whose
209 Id. at 34.
210 Id. at 57.
211 See id. at 42-45.
212 Id. at 58, 66.
213 See Jenine C. Boyd, The Competence-Related Abilities of Juveniles Prosecuted in
Criminal Court 36, 44 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Florida)
(on file with author).
214 See Randy K. Otto et al., Psychometric Properties of the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication, 10 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 435 (1998).
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full scale IQ was below 60.215 Boyd hypothesized that age and intelligence
would be positively correlated, and mental status would be negatively
correlated with MacCAT-CA scores.216
Boyd found IQ was associated with Understanding and Reasoning, but
not with the Appreciation subscale.21 7 The number of years of education
completed, depression, anxiety, and thinking disturbance were not
associated with any of the subscales.218 Age was not associated with
understanding and reasoning, but was associated with Appreciation. 2 9 The
author conceded that the correlation between age and appreciation "is
probably not meaningful given the poor internal consistency of the
Appreciation measure in this study. '' 220 All juvenile groups outscored the
adults on understanding, while youths fifteen and younger tied the adults on
reasoning, and sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds nearly accomplished this
feat. 1  Boyd concluded that, based on her findings, "the juveniles
prosecuted as adults have similar competence-related abilities to those of
adults. ''222 Boyd's study shows that qualified defendants are being chosen
for criminal prosecution in North Carolina.
Burnett's dissertation used the MacCAT-CA with seventy boys and
forty girls between the ages of ten and seventeen; seventy were in detention
awaiting trial in juvenile court, and forty were a comparison group not
involved with juvenile court.223  The comparison group differed
significantly from the offender group in several respects: gender, race, IQ
score, socioeconomic status (SES), father's and mother's education, and the
criminal history of father, mother, and siblings; the comparison group's
mean IQ score was 101.6, while the offender group's was 84.16.224 Burnett
hypothesized that age, IQ, SES, education level, and prior contacts with the
system would be positively related to scores on the subscales of the
MacCAT-CA, while parent and sibling criminal history would be
215 See Boyd, supra note 213, at 40.
216 Id. at 35.
217 Id. at 55 tbl.6.
218 See id. at 55 tbl. 6, 57 tbl.8, 69.
219 Id. at 57 tbl.8.
220 Id. at 70-71.
221 See id. at 60, 61 & tbl.11.
222 Id. at 70.
223 Darla Michele Rutherford Burnett, Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial in a
Juvenile Population 57 (Dec. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern
Mississippi) (on file with author).
224 Id. at 62 tbl.3, 63.
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negatively related.225 The comparison group was predicted to score higher
than the offender group.226
The offender group scored significantly lower than the comparison
group on the Reasoning subscale, but the two groups did not differ
227significantly on the Understanding measure. When Burnett controlled for
the nine variables that distinguished the offender and comparison groups,
significant differences in Reasoning scores remained.228 Age was found to
be related to the MacCAT-CA scores among the juveniles, especially in the
Appreciation measure. 229 To compare her sample with adults, she borrowed
adult scores from a previous study that had measured the psychometric
properties of the MacCAT-CA.23° Significant differences were found
between juveniles (ten to sixteen) and adults on both Understanding and
Reasoning, and some juveniles (ten to fourteen) and adults on
Appreciation.2 1 The seventeen-year-olds did not differ significantly from
adults on any scores, and the fifteen- to sixteen-year-olds equaled adults on
Appreciation.232
Burnett further analyzed the correlation between seven other variables
(IQ, SES, education level, prior court contacts, and father/mother/sibling
criminal history) and MacCAT-CA scores. 233  Only IQ contributed
significantly (and mother's criminal history somewhat) to the
Understanding score 234 only education level and prior court contacts
contributed significantly to Reasoning scores.235 Burnett found no gender
correlation with the MacCAT-CA scores, but she did find that blacks scored
significantly lower than whites on the Understanding and Reasoning scales,
but not on the Appreciation scale.236
Lexcen examined sixty-six male psychiatric inpatients between the
ages of ten and seventeen for her dissertation. 237  She administered the
MacCAT-CA and several other tests. Two-thirds of her sample were
225 Id. at 71-74.
226 See id. at 62.
227 See id. at 75. The Appreciation scale was not given to the comparison group.
221 See id. at 76.
229 Id. at 72.
230 See Otto et al., supra note 214.
231 Burnett, supra note 194, at 75 tbl.4.
232 Id. at 74-75.
231 Id. at 76-77.
234 Id, at 78 tbl.5.
235 Id. at 78-80 Tables 5, 6, 7.
236 See id. at 77.
237 See Frances J. Lexcen, Factors Associated with Juvenile Competence to Stand Trial:
Neuropsychological, Psychopathological and Psychosocial Variables (May 2000)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
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fourteen years of age and older, and most (78.9%) were white
(black= 10.6%); nearly one-half (47%) had prior experience with the
juvenile system. 238 Higher K-BIT verbal scores were associated with higher
scores on both the Understanding and Reasoning subscales; those with
higher factor scores for bipolar disorder symptoms were also more likely to
score higher in verbal intelligence tests.239 Poor motor coordination and a
history of disrupted family structure during childhood were associated with
lower Understanding scores. 240  Higher reasoning scores were also
associated with lower scores on both motor coordination and long-term
verbal memory. 241 Higher scores involving behavior disorder symptoms
were predictive of lower Reasoning scores, while difficulty in problem
solving had lower scores on Appreciation. 242 Age did not appear as a
243
significant predictor of competence.
The sample was asked to make decisions via the JATA developed by
Woolard. 24  Youths who scored better on perceptual organization and
short-term visual memory were more likely to talk to the police without
consulting a lawyer, and to recommend that the vignette character do the
same. 245 Youths with higher factor scores for psychotic symptoms were
less likely to recommend anyone cooperate with an attorney, and those with
better long-term verbal memory were more likely to say they would
cooperate with their attorney.246 Somewhat puzzling, those with higher K-
BIT verbal scores were likely to recommend a plea bargain for others, but
not for themselves, and subjects with better planning-organization and
problem-solving skills were less likely to recommend that the vignette
character accept a plea bargain that would substantially reduce the risk of
sanctions. 247  Lexcen explains these two "counter-intuitive" results
respectively as "compliance with authority figures" and evidence "that
judgment and decision-making arise from resources other than
intelligence.
2 48
Lyle's dissertation sample consisted of sixty urban minority males
between the ages of twelve and seventeen; the sample averaged four prior
238 Id. at 25.
239 See id. at 43-45.
240 Id. at 45.
241 Id. at 35.
242 See id. at 35, 45.
243 See id. at 47.
244 See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
245 Lexcen, supra note 237, at 37.
246 Id.
247 See id. at 37, 47.
248 Id. at 47.
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juvenile court appearances. 249 Lyle believed there would be a significant
relationship between emotional intelligence (EQI) and the defendants'
ability to appreciate their legal situation.250 Emotional intelligence is "an
array of emotional, personal and interpersonal abilities that influence one's
overall ability to cope with environmental demands and pressures., 251 Ten
factors influence emotional intelligence: self-regard, emotional self-
awareness, assertiveness, empathy, interpersonal relationship, stress
tolerance, impulse control, reality testing, flexibility, and problem-solving.
She hypothesized that the total EQI would be correlated with the three
MacCAT-CA measures.252  The relevant elements of EQI were
interpersonal and intrapersonal skills, stress management, and
adaptability. 253 Lyle divided the juveniles into two age groups: twelve-to-
fifteen and sixteen-to-seventeen.254 The only significant difference between
the groups occurred in the Appreciation scale, not in the Understanding or
Reasoning scales.255
There was no significant relationship between Understanding or
Reasoning and EQI, but EQI and Appreciation had significant correlations
for both age groups. 256  IQ scores were significantly correlated with
performances in the three subscales (except for the Reasoning scores for
sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds). 257  The most significant correlation
occurred between IQ and Understanding. Lyle also found a significant
correlation between previous court experience and Understanding.258 Two
of Lyle's three hypotheses were not supported: EQI did not impact
Understanding or Reasoning among juvenile defendants.259
Schmidt, Reppucci, and Woolard used a dataset that served as the
population from which Krause and Woolard drew their samples; they were
male, detained offenders (101 youths aged twelve to fifteen, 102 juveniles
249 See Victoria K. Lyle, Emotional Maturity and Trial Competence in Urban Male
Adolescents 15, 31 (May 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Walden University) (on file
with author).
250 Id. at 8, 31.
251 Id. at 10.
252 id. at 8.
253 See id. at 8, 10, 29.
254 Id. at 31.
255 See id. at 43.
256 Id. at 44 tbl.2.
257 Id.
258 See id. at 43-44.
259 Id. at 45-46.
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aged sixteen and seventeen, and 110 adults aged nineteen to thirty-five).260
The researchers employed the MacCAT-CA, but the main focus was the
attorney-client relationship. 26' The JATA was used to determine if age was
related to identifying options in interacting with counsel, mentioning
consequences of these options, telling the vignette character how to
proceed, and reporting what they would do in the vignette character's
262
situation.
Schmidt and her colleagues hypothesized:
[T]hat adolescents [would] be more likely than adults to identify and select options
such as refusing to talk to an attorney and denying involvement in the
offense... [m]ention more total short-term consequences and more consequences
associated with potential short-term gains ... [and particularly among African-
American youths,] make more negative references to their attorney's effectiveness,
their level of trust in their attorneys, and their views toward court-appointed
attorneys.
2 6 3
The study found juveniles were more likely than adults to identify
refusing to talk to the attorney, to recommend that the vignette character
both deny involvement in the offense and not communicate honestly with
defense counsel.2 64 Blacks and minorities were less likely than whites to
tell the vignette character to talk to counsel (as were those with a detention
history, who were also less likely to report that they would talk to their
attorney). 6 5 The exact import and significance of these findings is to be
seriously questioned, however. This is so because neither IQ nor the
adjudicative competence measure (that is the MacCAT-CA score) was a
significant predictor of the recommendation to the vignette character. Even
more critical, the data also revealed that neither age nor race nor IQ nor
MacCAT-CA score was related to subjects' reporting whether they would
talk to their attorneys and would admit the offense; the vast majority of all
segments of the sample stated they would communicate truthfully with
counsel.266
Redlich, Silverman, and Steiner examined thirty-five subjects,
eighteen of whom were between the ages of fourteen and seventeen, and
260 Melinda G. Schmidt, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard, Effectiveness of
Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. SCi. &
L. 175, 181 (2003).
261 Id. at 177-81.
262 Id. at 184-85.
263 Id. at 181.
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seventeen of whom were young adults.26' The hypothesis was that younger
age, higher suggestibility, lower IQ, and lower frequency of police contacts
would be associated with lower competency-to-stand-trial scores. 268
Redlich, Silverman, and Steiner used the MacCAT-CA, and examined
relationships among age, suggestibility, intelligence, and frequency of
police contacts.2 69  The only significant correlation was the inverse
relationship between frequency of police contacts and intelligence.270
Redlich, Silverman, and Steiner found age related to the Understanding
score as well as to total test scores, but not related to the Reasoning or
Appreciation subscales. 271  Higher school grades were associated with
improved competence.272
Baerger, Griffin, Lyons, and Simmons examined 132 youths that had
been declared incompetent to stand trial between 1989 and 1999, and 473
youths that were deemed competent to stand trial between 1995 and 1996,
all from areas surrounding Chicago.273 The profile of the incompetent to
stand trial defendants was a fourteen-year-old black youth with a history of
special education needs, an IQ in the mildly retarded range, and a history of
previous arrests and alcohol and drug use.274 The researchers found that
age, a history of special education needs, and prior mental health treatment
all had a predictive effect on the competent to stand trial determination.2 75
The MacArthur Study, which was funded by the MacArthur
Foundation and conducted by the leading DPs in the juvenile competency to
stand-trial area, investigated 927 adolescents (ages eleven through
seventeen) in detention and community settings, and 466 adults (ages
eighteen through twenty-three) in jails and community settings.276 Grisso
and his team used the MacCAT-CA.2 77 Two comments in the MacArthur
Study claim an absence of research reports involving the use of the
267 Allison D. Redlich, Melissa Silverman & Hans Steiner, Pre-Adjudicative and
Adjudicative Competence in Juveniles and Young Adults, 21 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 393, 397
(2003).
268 Id. at 397.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 401.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 See Dana Royce Baerger et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjudicated and
Petitioned Juvenile Defendants, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 314, 316 (2003).
274 Id. at 318.
275 Id. at 317.
276 Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 337
(2003).
277 Id. at 336.
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MacCAT-CA with adolescents: (1) "There are no reports on its use with
youths' 278 and (2) "At the time of the present study, there were no
publications reporting use of the MacCAT-CA with adolescents. 279
Besides the MacCAT-CA, the MacArthur Study focused on previous
experiences in the justice system, IQ level, mental health problems, risk
perception, future time perspective, compliance with authority, and
resistance to peer influence.280 The psychosocial factors were measured via
the MacJen, a variation of the JATA used by Woolard and Lexcen in their
dissertations. Juveniles were divided into three groups: eleven to thirteen,
fourteen to fifteen, and sixteen to seventeen. 28' Nearly 50% of the juveniles
were detained, while one-half of the adults were jailed. 82 The average IQ
score of those detained (86.28) was substantially lower than that of the
community participants (97.46).283 The detained juveniles' IQ (85.58) was
significantly lower than the jailed adults (87.65), while the IQ of juveniles
in the community (96.41) was also significantly lower than adults in that
location (99.59).284 The demographics also suggest that the mean IQ score
was the lowest for the two youngest detained groups (eleven to
thirteen = 84.8; fourteen to fifteen = 84.3), which also had a
disproportionate distribution of the lowest IQ groupings (60-74).285 The
eleven- to thirteen-year-old group also had the highest concentration of
minority males from the lowest SES group.286
There were no age differences found for consultation with either a
287public defender or a private attorney. More than 75% of each age group
recommended full disclosure to defense counsel.288 There was a significant
age difference for accepting a plea bargain, but none in the resistance to
278 Id.
279 Id. at 339. At the beginning of data collection, only the Krause and Woolard
dissertations were published. By the end of data collection, however, a few more
dissertations involving the MacCAT-CA and adolescents had materialized-Boyd's,
Burnett's, and Lexcen's. Woolard and Lexcen were on the MacArthur team. If these
comments are a reference to the fact that none of the dissertations were published, then the
second statement may be technically correct. The MacArthur Study reviewed none of the
previous research in this area, and to suggest that there are no reports on MacCAT use with
juveniles is misleading, if not disingenuous.
280 Id. at 338-39.
281 Id. at 337.
282 Id.
283 See MacArthur Research Network, supra note 187, at 11-12.
284 Id.
285 Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 350, 360. Approximately two-thirds of detained
fifteen-year-olds and younger had an IQ score below 89.
286 See MacArthur Research Network, supra note 187.
287 See Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 351-52 fig.9.
288 Id.
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peer influence measure.2 89 The eleven- to thirteen-year-old age group
(74%) was much more inclined than young adults (50%) to accept the
prosecutor's offer.29°
Age was found to be related to "compliance with authority" as eleven-
to thirteen-year-olds and fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds were both more
compliant than sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds and young adults; the latter
two groups did not significantly differ from each other.291 This compliance
with authority factor was determined in part by recommending confessing
to police, which is not an aspect of adjudicative competence. Compliance
with authority was also measured by full disclosure to defense counsel
(expected of competent defendants), and acceptance of a plea bargain (not
an inappropriate or incompetent decision of itself). Thus, the relationship
between compliance with authority and competence to stand trial is unclear,
if not paradoxical.
Age was related to risk appraisal and recognition, and to future
orientation. The eleven- to thirteen-year-old group scored lower than both
the sixteen- to seventeen-year-old and adult groups in recognizing risk; the
fourteen- to fifteen-year-old group was not significantly different from any
other group. 292 Similarly, eleven- to thirteen-year-olds reported fewer long
range consequences than sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds; fourteen- to
fifteen-year-olds and young adults were not significantly different from any
other group.293
The MacArthur Study found that age and IQ were significantly related
to MacCAT-CA scores, while prior experience in the justice system was
unrelated and mental health problems were "largely" unrelated.294  Age
remained a significant predictor of all subscale scores when IQ was
controlled, but there were marginally significant interactions between IQ
and age for both Understanding and Appreciation scores.295
The MacArthur group created significantly impaired, mildly impaired,
and not or minimally impaired classifications as suggested by the MacCAT-
CA performances:
The cut-off score for "clinically significant impairment" was set at the score
equaling 1.5 standard deviations below the mean of the "presumed competent"
samples in the original norming study. Performance above 1.0 standard deviation
below the mean for those samples [was] considered to represent "minimal or no
289 Id. at 352-53.
290 Id. at 352 fig.9.
291 See id. at 353.
292 Id. at 353-54.
293 See id. at 354.
294 Id. at 346-47.
29 See id. at 348.
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impairment.["I Scores between those two cut-offs were labeled "mild
impairment. '
Based on this assumption the MacArthur group identified 30% of the
eleven- to thirteen-year-olds, 19% of the fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds, and
12% of the sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds and adults as "significantly
impaired" due to scores on the Understanding and Reasoning subscales. 97
Overall, adults performed slightly worse than the sixteen- to seventeen-
year-olds.2 98 The study found no variation in gender, ethnicity, SES, and
geography, but lower IQ scores were correlated with worse performances
on the MacCAT-CA.299
In the end, age was related to risk recognition and long-term
consequence identification, in addition to performance on the MacCAT-
CA.300 The MacArthur group admitted that they did not find large numbers
of actual incompetent to stand trial adolescents since even "[a] score in the
'clinically significant impairment' range does not represent 'incompetence
to stand trial.' 301 This admission was necessary because the MacCAT-CA
"assesses capacities that are relevant for the competence question, but not
legal competence itself."
302
Although the MacArthur group admitted that the study results had to
be carefully interpreted, they emphasized that their study found that eleven-
to thirteen-year-olds were "more than three times" (actually 2.5 times-
30% vs. 12%) "as likely as young adults to be 'seriously impaired' on the
evaluation of competence-relevant abilities," while those fourteen to fifteen
years old "were twice" (actually 1.6 times-19% vs. 12%) "as likely as
young adults to be 'seriously impaired.' 30 3 Success rates of 70% and 81%,
respectively, for the eleven- to thirteen-year-olds and fourteen- to fifteen-
year-olds were not sufficient to let them escape a suggestion from the
MacArthur Study authors that they were presumptively incompetent: "Our
results indicate that juveniles aged fifteen and younger are significantly
more likely than older adolescents and young adults to be impaired in ways
296 MacArthur Research Network, supra note 187, at 21.
297 See Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 344, 356.
298 Id,
299 Id. at 344, 347-48.
300 Id. at 344, 353-55.
301 MacArthur Research Network, supra note 187, at 21.
302 Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 357.
303 MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK, THE MACARTHUR JUVENILE COMPETENCE STUDY:
SUMMARY 2 (2002), available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/58competence-study-
summary.pdf.
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that compromise their ability to serve as competent defendants in a criminal
proceeding. 3 °4
While technically accurate, this reporting style is very misleading.
Imagine the report that would have been written by the MacArthur group
had 90% of the eleven- to thirteen-year-olds, 95% of the fourteen- to
fifteen-year-olds, and 99% of the sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds and adults
passed the MacCAT-CA. All of these imagined defendants would have
performed better than those in the MacArthur Study (and probably close to
actual numbers). The DPs would report, however, that among the imagined
defendants, eleven- to thirteen-year-olds were ten times as likely, while
fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds were five times as likely as sixteen- to
seventeen-year-olds and adults to be incompetent to stand trial.
Warren, Aaron, Ryan, Chauhan, and Duval studied 120 males between
the ages of ten and seventeen who had been hospitalized for psychiatric
treatment.30 5 They measured IQ via the K-BIT, and examined the severity
of psychiatric symptoms (hallucinations, conceptual disorganization,
depression, anxiety, motor retardation, emotional withdrawal, hostility, and
uncooperativeness), and serious emotional or mental disorders among
youths (anger, thought disorder, somatic complaints, drug/alcohol use,
suicidal ideation, and depression).30 6 Ten (or 8%) of the participating
sample had an IQ score below 60.
Warren and her colleagues divided the youths into two groups: ages
ten to thirteen (n = 40) and fourteen to seventeen (n - 80).308 The younger
group had significantly higher scores on the Verbal (99.54) and Matrices
(99.15) subtests of the K-BIT than the older youths (91.07 and 90.40,
respectively). 30 9 The older group also significantly differed in displaying
more symptomatology than the younger one on the depression subscale of
one psychiatric test as well as the alcohol/drugs, suicide, trauma, and total
score of the MAYSI.
310
Perhaps the better equipped status of the younger juveniles explains
why Warren and her colleagues found no significant differences between
the younger and older groups on all the MacCAT-CA measures. IQ was
found to have the strongest relationship to Understanding, Reasoning, and
304 Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 356.
305 Janet I. Warren et al., Correlates of Adjudicative Competence Among Psychiatrically
Impaired Juveniles, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 299, 301 (2003).
306 Id. at 302.
307 Id.
301 Id. at 303 tbl.1.
309 Id.
310 See id. at 303. The MAYSI is the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument.
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Appreciation. 31  The study concluded: "These findings suggest that some
youths as young as ten years demonstrate a level of performance on the
MacCAT-CA that is comparable in some ways to that of competent
adults. 312
Viljoen's dissertation examined the interrogative and adjudicative
competence of 152 detained defendants between the ages of eleven and
seventeen (73 females; 79 males) awaiting trial. They were divided into
three groups: ages eleven to thirteen (n = 50); fourteen to fifteen (n = 51);
and sixteen to seventeen (n = 5 1).313 Viljoen was interested in adolescents'
predictions of how they would plead, accept a plea bargain, communicate
with counsel, react if they disagreed with counsel, and appeal guilty
verdicts. The sample was mostly white (60%), black (26.3%), or Hispanic
(7.9%), with some representation of Native Indians (3.95%) and Asians
(1.3%); most of the participants (63.2%) were classified as being at the two
lowest SES levels (IV and V), the average age was 14.52, and the mean IQ
score was a relatively low 82.57.314
The researcher examined general intelligence and five broad cognitive
clusters, including "comprehension-knowledge or verbal abilities (a
measure of acquired knowledge), fluid reasoning (the ability to recognize
patterns and make logical inferences), long-term retrieval (the ability to
store and retrieve information), attention (the ability to attend to relevant
information), and executive processing (the ability to plan and control
behavior). 315 She also measured psychopathology, including "depression-
anxiety (... . depressed mood and feelings of inferiority), psychomotor
excitation ( ... hyperactivity and distractibility), and behavior problems
... hostility and manipulativeness). 316
To gauge adjudicative competence, Viljoen used the Fitness Interview
Test, Revised Edition (FIT-R), which is a semi-structured, clinical
interview consisting of sixteen items divided into three sections:
Understanding (knowledge of current charges, roles of key participants,
etc.); Appreciation (understanding possible penalties, legal defenses, etc.);
... See id. at 304 tbl.2.
312 Id. at 306.
313 See Jodi L. Viljoen, Police Interrogation and Criminal Adjudication of Child and
Adolescent Defendants: Legal Abilities, Decisions, and Standards 39-40, 71 tbl.1 (Apr.
2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Simon Fraser University) (on file with Simon Fraser
University).
314 See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent
Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals,
29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 256 (2005). This article was one of two publications of
Viljoen's dissertation.
315 Id. at 256-57.
316 Id. at 257.
[Vol. 99
JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
and Communication (communicating facts, planning and engaging in the
defense, challenging witnesses, and so on).3 17 Viljoen also included several
situational variables such as whether the defendant had confessed, had a
private attorney, or had prior arrests, and also considered the perception of
the evidence against the accused, and the number of weeks spent in
custody.318
Viljoen examined five cognitive clusters: verbal, retrieval, fluid
reasoning, attention, and executive ability.319  She discovered significant
correlations between age and three of the five cognitive clusters (all but
retrieval and fluid reasoning) as well as in general intellectual ability
(GIA).320  The two youngest groups scored significantly lower than the
sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds in GIA and attention; the youngest group
scored significantly lower than the sixteen- to seventeen-year-olds on verbal
and executive abilities. 32' The data show that the detained population in
this study was well below average in the development of cognitive
abilities.322
Age was also correlated with performance on the three subscales of the
FIT-R. The youngest group scored significantly lower on all subscales than
the two older groups. 323  The fourteen- to fifteen-year-olds scored
significantly lower on Understanding than the sixteen- to seventeen-year-
olds, but not significantly lower on the Appreciation and Communication
subscales.324
Viljoen found significant associations between age and GIA, as well as
between GIA and legal abilities. Not surprisingly, "the association between
age and legal ... capacities decreased when GIA, in addition to age, was
entered in the regression equations. 325 Somewhat puzzling is that GIA was
inversely associated with Understanding. 326  Viljoen discovered that
317 See id. at 258; see also RONALD ROESCH ET AL., FIT-R: FITNESS INTERVIEW TEST-
REVISED (2006).
318 Viljoen et al., supra note 314, at 256, 259.
319 See Jodi L. Viljoen & Ronald Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights and
Adjudicative Competence in Adolescent Defendants: Cognitive Development, Attorney
Contact, and Psychological Symptoms, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 731 (2005). This




323 Id. at 732.
324 Id. Also scoring lower on the FIT-R were those who "showed evidence of attention
deficits or hyperactivity, came from below average socioeconomic classes, and had spent
limited time with their attorneys." See Viljoen, supra note 313, at 165.
325 Viljoen & Roesch, supra note 319, at 732.
326 See Viljoen et al., supra note 314, at 55.
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previous arrests were associated with higher scores on understanding
adjudicative proceedings, and that contact with attorneys (meeting with an
attorney and time spent with one) was a strong predictor of legal capacities
relevant to adjudication. 327 Viljoen did not find an association between
psychological symptoms (for example, depression, anxiety, or behavior
problems) and adjudicative competency; ADHD was associated with ability
to communicate with counsel. Females scored significantly lower than
males on understanding adjudicative proceedings.328 SES was also related
to legal abilities, even after intellectual deficits were controlled.329
Age was not related to the decision to plead.33° Most other variables
were also not significantly related to cognitive abilities, the three areas of
psychopathology, and most of the situational variables. 331 Of the latter,
only perceived stronger evidence against the accused was linked with a
decision to plead guilty for those in the fifteen-to-seventeen age group, and
not for the eleven to fourteen age group.332 Although none of the six
clusters of cognitive abilities was associated with a plea decision or
uncertainty in pleading, those with higher FIT-R scores in all subscales
were significantly more likely to decide to plead one way or another as
opposed to not being sure how to plead, which had much lower FIT-R
scores.
333
Viljoen found no age differences in the decision to accept a plea
bargain, but males were significantly more likely than females to reject one,
as were those with lower cognitive ability scores.33 Viljoen failed to
mention that those who rejected the plea bargain also had lower cognitive
ability scores (in all but general intelligence) than the group unsure about
the plea bargain. But they also had FIT-R (or legal ability) scores that were
higher than the unsure group, and were not significantly lower than the
group accepting the plea bargain.335 While psychopathology was not
related to the plea bargain decision, those with more prior arrests and who
had spent more weeks in custody were significantly more likely to accept or
reject a plea bargain than to be unsure about it. Stronger evidence against
327 See Viljoen & Roesch, supra note 319, at 732.
328 See id. at 738.
329 See Viljoen, supra note 313, at 60.
330 See Viljoen et al., supra note 314, at 264.
331 See id.
332 See id. at 265-66.
333 See Viljoen et al., supra note 314, at 264.
334 See id. at 266.
131 See id. at 267.
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was linked to accepting a plea bargain, but only for fifteen- to seventeen-
year-olds.336
Age was not related to the decision to disclose to the attorney, but
gender and race were. Males and blacks/ethnic minorities were
significantly more likely to say no or unsure to whether they would fully
disclose to counsel.337 Among the situational variables, only the stronger
perceived evidence (for older adolescents) was associated with a decision to
disclose.338  Those inclined to disclose had significantly higher
Appreciation and Communication scores on the FIT-R, but not significantly
higher Understanding scores; they also had higher cognitive scores in four
of the six areas, but not in Reasoning and Attention.339
The first time that age was correlated with a legal decision occurred
when defendants were asked about what they would do if they had a
disagreement with their attorneys. 340  Defendants who responded they
would go along with what the lawyer wanted or stated they believed they
could get in trouble for disagreeing were identified as "compliant." These
individuals and those who were unsure what they would do were
significantly more likely to be younger and from lower SES than youths
who gave "assertive" responses (meaning they would talk to or instruct a
lawyer). The compliant defendants were also significantly more likely to
score higher on the psychomotor excitation index and to score lower on the
FIT-R subscales and on most of the cognitive abilities areas-all but
Reasoning and Executive Processing-than the assertive types. 341 The
unsure defendants also were significantly lower on the FIT-R subscales and
on most of the cognitive abilities areas (all but Reasoning) than assertive
defendants, but there were no significant differences between these two
types in the psychopathology variables. 342 The most interesting aspect of
the data, ignored by Viljoen, is that the compliant defendants had the
highest average prior arrest profile; perhaps they had learned that "taking
on" the defense attorney in juvenile court was to no avail.343
Finally, defendants who would not seek an appeal or who were unsure
about it were younger and scored significantly lower on the FIT-R
subscales.344 There were no significant differences in any of the other
336 See id. at 265-66.
311 Id. at 267 tbl.5.
338 Id.
331 Id. at 267.
340 Id. at 268.
141 Id. at 269.
342 See id. at 268-69.
141 See id. at 269.
34 Id. at 270.
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demographic variables, in any of the situational variables, in any of the
cognitive abilities areas, and in any of the psychopathology contexts.
345
Viljoen created categories of impairment based on her FIT-R data.
She determined that scores of two or more standard deviations below adult
means or "norms" on one or more scales of the FIT-R meant the juveniles
in her study were impaired, or incompetent to stand trial. 46 Viljoen found
85.5% of the eleven- to fourteen-year-olds and 53.9% of the fifteen- to
seventeen-year-olds to be impaired.347 She then re-estimated the impaired
population using so-called adolescent norms. 348 This figure was achieved
by establishing a cut-off score at two standard deviations below the mean
scores attained by the juvenile study sample on the FIT-R. 349  The
percentage of youths considered impaired decreased markedly (16.2% of
eleven- to fourteen-year-olds; 2.8% of those aged fifteen to seventeen)
under the adolescent norms formula.350 Finally, Viljoen created a third,
"proposed" standard based on a recommendation that youths prosecuted
within the juvenile system need only a "basic understanding of the purpose
of the proceedings" as well as an ability to "communicate rationally with
counsel. 3 51 How this "standard" differs from the Dusky requirements is
unclear and unexplained. Viljoen declared that sample youths who fell
three or more standard deviations below adult means on Understanding and
Communication were impaired.352 This "proposed standard" produced a
rate of impairment (73.3% of eleven- to fourteen-year-olds; 40.8% of
fifteen- to seventeen-year-olds) that fell between the other two standards.353
Viljoen acknowledges the arbitrary nature of the determination of
impairment and that "[i]t is likely that the rates of incompetency are
substantially lower than the rates of impairment found here. 354 Although
age yielded different responses to some of the legal decisions facing the
sample, poor.legal abilities-that is, low FIT-R scores-factored into more
problematic or controversial responses, such as rejecting a plea bargain and
an opportunity to appeal the case, and not disclosing information to or
failing to discuss disagreements with an attorney. Most disturbing is that
345 See id.
346 See Viljoen, supra note 313, at 95.
347 id.
141 Id. at 96-97, 113.
141 Id. at 95-96.
350 Id. at 96-97, 113.
351 These criteria were borrowed from Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative
Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 111, at 73.
352 Viljoen, supra note 313, at 96-97, 113.
... See id.
114 Id. at 106.
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males and ethnic minorities said they were less likely to trust defense
attorneys and to disclose information to them.355
Poythress, Lexcen, Grisso, and Steinberg compared two male, detained
groups of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds with a male, jailed adult
offender sample. One of the juvenile groups had been transferred to adult
court by prosecutors, while the second had been prosecuted in juvenile
court. The transferred youths (n=105) was a secondary sample associated
with the MacArthur Study, while the youths from juvenile court (n= 118)
and the adult defendants (n= 165) were two comparison samples drawn from
the original MacArthur Study.356 The researchers used the Understanding
and Reasoning subscales from the MacCAT-CA; they also employed a so-
called RRI, which refers to "recogniz[ing] relevant information.
357
Specifically, the RRI involves the defendant's ability "to distinguish
information that is more, or less, relevant to constructing a legal defense





The transferred youths outperformed the adults on all three measures
related to the MacCAT-CA (Understanding, Reasoning, and RRI), and were
significantly better on Understanding; those prosecuted in juvenile court
outperformed the adults on two of the measures (Understanding and RRI),
while they tied on the third (Reasoning). 359 The study also utilized the
MacArthur Judgment Evaluation (MacJEN). There were no significant
differences among the three groups concerning consultation with a public
defender, but the youths prosecuted in juvenile court were less likely to
recommend full disclosure to a private attorney compared to the other two
groups. 360 Although those prosecuted in juvenile court displayed nearly
equal or superior Understanding and Reasoning (and RRI) as the other two
groups, they were most likely to be reluctant to fully disclose to private
attorneys. 361 This suggests that age does not explain hesitancy in confiding
in these defense attorneys. Lastly, as to psychosocial factors, the MacJEN
revealed no significant group differences in risk recognition, risk impact,
and future orientation; adults were significantly higher than the juvenile
court group on risk likelihood, while transferred youths were slightly higher
355 See Viljoen et al., supra note 314, at 266-68, 271.
356 See Norman G. Poythress et al., The Competence-Related Abilities of Adolescent
Defendants in Criminal Court, 30 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 75, 76-79 (2006).
151 Id. at 85-86.
... Id. at 80.
311 See id. at 85.
360 See id. at 86-87.
361 Id. at 87 tbl.3.
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than juvenile court youths in this category.362 Transferred youths were also
significantly higher than the juvenile court group and the adults in their
mean score on resistance to peer influence. 363 The researchers concluded:
This examination of 16-17-year old defendants transferred to criminal court by
direct file found few differences between them and 18-24-year old criminal
defendants in competence-related abilities and developmental characteristics with
potential significance for decision making in the legal process. Where differences
existed, they suggested somewhat better performance for the Direct File sample than
for the Adult Defendant sample. The results of this study, therefore, provide no basis
for concern that direct-file mechanisms in the transfer to criminal court of 16-17-year
old male adolescents, who, as a result of immaturity, have impaired competence-
related abilities relative to those of adults.
364
Ficke, Hart, and Deardorff studied 247 detained youths who were
mostly minorities (66% black, 31% white) and males (81%), between the
ages of nine and eighteen.365 They divided the youths into four age groups:
nine to twelve (n = 26); thirteen to fourteen (n = 74); fifteen to sixteen
(n = 100); and seventeen to eighteen (n = 47).366 Ficke and her colleagues
constructed an estimated intelligence score, measured academic
achievement skills (reading, spelling, and math), and assessed psychiatric
symptoms.
367
The oldest group differed significantly from the others in three major
variables; the seventeen- to eighteen-year-olds had a higher estimated IQ,
better math and reading skills, and more charges (or juvenile court
history).368 The three younger groups did not differ among themselves in
the IQ or math and reading skills. The youngest group had significantly
higher scores on the psychiatric tests than the other groups, indicating a
greater likelihood of displaying problematic behavior (hostility, lack of
cooperation, and being manipulative) and motor excitation (hyperactivity
and distractibility).369
Ficke and her colleagues employed the MacCAT-CA to gauge
competency to stand trial. Although they found no differences between
boys and girls, the data revealed "a small but significant relationship
between age and estimated IQ .... Age also correlated significantly with
362 Id. at 88 tbl.4.
363 See id. at 87.
364 Id. at 88.
365 See Susan LaVelle Ficke, Kathleen J. Hart & Paul A. Deardorff, The Performance of
Incarcerated Juveniles on the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal
Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 360, 363 (2006).
366 Id. at 363-64.
367 Id.
368 Id. at 364.
369 See id.
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achievement skills and number of charges."37  Estimated IQ correlated
significantly with both academic skills and the three subscale scores of the
MacCAT-CA.371 Age also was significantly related to the MacCAT-CA
scores, but the correlation was weaker than the IQ, math, and reading
skills.372 While the nine- to twelve-year-old group scored significantly
lower than all other age groups on all three scales, there were no significant
differences between the remaining age groups on any of the scales.373
Neither prior juvenile court history nor developmental maladjustment-
such as depression, withdrawal, disorientation, anxiety, hallucinations, and
delusions-was related to the MacCAT-CA scores.374
The researchers then used MacCAT-CA scores to estimate the
percentage of "clinically significant" impaired youth. In the Understanding
subscale, the nine- to twelve-year-old group had a much higher rate (almost
62%) than the thirteen-to-fourteen-, fifteen-to-sixteen-, and seventeen-to-
eighteen-year-old groups (between 14% and 22%). 375 The same held in the
Reasoning subscale where the nine- to twelve-year-old group had a much
higher rate (50%) than the thirteen-to-fourteen-, fifteen-to-sixteen-, and
seventeen-to-eighteen year-old groups (14% to 22%).376 Ficke and the
other researchers acknowledged that their results were worse than other
studies and said that this could be due to the low IQ (mean = 76.17) of their
sample (especially for the nine- to twelve-year-olds), which was much
lower than other studies (for example, the MacArthur study mean IQ was
86). 377  They also admitted the limits of the MacCAT-CA's ability to
determine competency to stand trial and that the relatively high numbers of
incompetent to stand trial juveniles are inflated.3 78
D. THE CASE, SUCH AS IT IS: A SUMMARY OF THE JAI RESEARCH
Thus far, the DPs' research has not supported their claim that juveniles
are incompetent to stand trial in criminal court. Examination of arguably
the most salient and significant variable in this inquiry, scores on various
competency tests, has produced divided results. Age has been found
related and not related to these scores. The relationship between age and
various factors has also produced conflicting results. Thus, factors such as
370 Id. at 365-66.
371 Id. at 366 tbl.2.
372 Id. at 366, 367 tbl.3.
171 See id. at 367.
171 See id. at 366, 370.
175 Id. at 368.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 372.
378 See id. at 367-69, 372.
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peer attachment or influence, accepting a plea bargain, risk perception, risk
appraisal, risk recognition, risk preference, and future orientation or
temporal perspective have and have not been associated with age.
Otherwise, age has been found related-but not significantly-to
understanding the defense attorney's role, and to responsibility and
consideration of others, but not in a linear fashion and with no adverse
effects on performance in the MacCAT-CA. Age was associated with not
agreeing with counsel and with not seeking an appeal.
The list of variables with which age has been found to be not
associated includes emotional distress, decisional temperance (including
sensation seeking, impulse control, and suppression of aggression),
perspective, trust in one's lawyer or in people in authority, disclosure to
counsel, decision to plead, and parent attachment.
The relationship between a number of variables and performance on
various competency tests has also yielded mixed results. Studies have
divided in finding a correlation between competency scores and previous
juvenile court history, and gender, race, or socioeconomic status. Although
competency scores have not been correlated with depression, anxiety or
thinking disturbance, mental health problems, or mental health services
history, they have been correlated with previous severe mental health
diagnosis or treatment and mental retardation.
Years of education have not been related to competency scores, but
education level has, as have high school grades and remedial or special
education. By far, the most consistent and significant, and logically
expected, variable found to be related to competency scores is IQ score.
Other, more esoteric factors found to be related to competency scores range
from poor performance on motor coordination, to a history of disrupted
family structure, to mother or sibling history of criminal conduct, to the
number and length of contacts with the defense attorney. Most of the JAI
research has continuously delivered the message that the vast majority of
juveniles are competent to stand trial. Many are even equal to adults in
competency performance measures, from very young ages such as eleven to
thirteen years old and especially by fourteen and fifteen years of age.
Furthermore, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds have consistently
outperformed the adults on the MacCAT-CA.
IV. THE OBSTACLE: SEVERAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING THE CLAIM THAT
JUVENILES ARE INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
The DPs have relied upon several interrelated and faulty premises in
developing the claim that juveniles are incompetent to stand trial in criminal
court.
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A. DPS' FAULTY PREMISES ABOUT JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO
STAND TRIAL
1. That Competency to Stand Trial Is Relative or That There Are Degrees of
Competence
Choosing to identify the defendant who is legally capable of being
tried as competent to stand trial may have been an unfortunate description
to adopt. It can easily lead to misinterpretation, as competence is a relative
term. However, "competent to stand trial" is a legal standard imposing a
threshold. The Supreme Court put any notion of relativity to rest long ago:
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to
ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.
While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and
degrees of competence, . . . the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional
requirements.379
In retrospect, it might have been wiser to label the defendant
"certified" or "eligible" to stand trial. Defendants would not likely be
considered more or less certified or eligible to stand trial. Some defendants
are more competent than others in performing certain tasks, such as
remembering the incident or communicating with counsel. To that extent,
some defendants are "better" or more effective than others; defendants have
not been created equal in abilities. Once defendants have passed the
necessary-that is, Dusky-threshold they are competent to stand trial; none
is "more competent to stand trial" than others. Similarly, defendants must
waive rights voluntarily with an understanding of the consequences of the
waiver. While some defendants feel less pressure, are more intelligent, and
possess a better understanding of the implications behind a waiver than
others, surrender of rights by the better equipped is not "more valid" than
when made by the lesser equipped.
A parallel situation can be seen in licensed automobile drivers. Some
drivers are better than others at performing certain driving-related tasks, and
there are some incompetent drivers, but that does not mean that some are
"more licensed to drive" than others. Once all drivers pass the necessary
minimum threshold, they occupy the same legal status as a licensed driver.
There would have been much confusion if authorized drivers were
identified as competent to drive instead of licensed to do so.
Casting competency to stand trial as a relative or continuous entity is
central to the DPs' assertion that juveniles are incompetent to stand trial in
criminal court. It is incorrect and a misrepresentation of the legal concept.
379 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993).
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In the end, defendants have a right to equal justice, but, contrary to the DPs'
suggestions, there is no right to be as equally capable as others in
performing as an accused at trial.
2. That Juveniles on Average Are Less Competent to Stand Trial Than
Adults Means That All Juveniles Are Incompetent to Stand Trial
The DPs, again relying upon relativity to construct another flawed
premise, argue that by sometimes registering lower scores than adults in
some competency tests, juveniles revealed themselves to be less competent
to stand trial as a group:
The scores that were earned by juveniles on the MacCAT-CA were not equal to
those of adults which indicates that juveniles do not adequately understand all of the
issues that are involved in competence to stand trial.
380
Similarly, after acknowledging that adults have deficiencies, Professor
Grisso asserts:
The question for policy and judicial decisions about juvenile competence,
therefore, is not whether they have deficits in these areas, but whether their deficits
are sufficiently great to render them less capable of participating in their defense than
is the average adult defendant. Do adolescents' capacities relevant for trial
competence differ on average from those of adults?
381
The juvenile-as-lesser something-than-an-adult argument prevailed
recently in Roper v Simmons.382 In Roper, the Court held that the lesser
culpability of a juvenile murderer as compared to an adult murderer
exempted juvenile murderers from the death penalty as a categorical rule.383
Three critical differences exist between juvenile culpability and juvenile
competency, however, which make an extension of the Roper logic to
competency to stand trial inappropriate. First, unlike competency,
culpability has long been recognized as relative, such that aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, such as youth, should affect sentencing.384
Inasmuch as there needs to be proportionality between culpability and
punishment (and offense), especially in capital cases, it is hardly
astonishing that the Supreme Court would find that juveniles are generally
less culpable than adults and less deserving of the ultimate punishment.385
The lesser culpability of juveniles was the cornerstone of the founding of
380 Burnett, supra note 223, at 88.
381 Grisso, supra note 107, at 29.
382 543 U.S. 551, 570-71 (2005).
383 Id. at 573-75.
384 See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins
for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 463 (2003).
385 See id.
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juvenile court.3 86  Competency to stand trial is not a matter of
proportionality, however; it is equally necessary for the prosecution of
crime in juvenile and criminal court. Moreover, whereas most (if not all)
fourteen- and fifteen-year-old murderers could demonstrate lesser
culpability vis-a-vis adult murderers (everything being relative in
culpability), most (if not all) fourteen- and fifteen-year-old juvenile
murderers would be competent (unless the elements of competency are
radically redefined).
Second, the major substantive difference is that while lack of maturity
and responsibility, susceptibility to peer pressure, and a less developed
character (among other things) certainly affect culpability, they do not have
relevance to one's being able to comprehend the trial proceedings and to
assist counsel. Diminished culpability does not mean diminished
competency. It is one thing to be unable to execute a fourteen- and fifteen-
year-old murderer where a very substantial prison sentence is still available;
it is quite another to not be able to prosecute a fourteen- and fifteen-year-
old murderer in criminal court.
Third, the Supreme Court's methodology in establishing a categorical
exemption for the juvenile death penalty followed the precedent it had
established for the execution of the mentally retarded in Atkins v
Virginia.387 In both, cases the Court relied upon a national trend in state
legislation toward prohibiting the death penalty for the two populations. In
the competency arena, however, the national trend in legislation and case
law is to retain traditional Dusky elements in determining competency, to
apply Dusky to both juvenile and criminal courts, and to permit the
prosecution of rather young chronic and violent juvenile offenders in
criminal court under Dusky requirements.
Competency to stand trial is an individual phenomenon and not a
categorical or group one. In order to be found incompetent to stand trial, it
is not enough that juveniles merely differ or are generally less capable than
adults. Individual juveniles must be incapable. There can be little doubt
that there is a difference between the two populations generally and that
youths overall are less capable than adults in many legal endeavors; more
youths overall would likely be found to be incompetent to stand trial when
compared to adults. The same can apply within categories of adults with
regard to mental ability, educational attainment, gender, class, race, or age.
If the DPs' logic carries, broad categories of adults will be incompetent to
stand trial vis-A-vis other categories of adults. Higher percentages of men
386 See Daniel P. Mears et al., Public Opinion and the Foundation of the Juvenile Court,
45 CRIMINOLOGY 223, 224 (2007).
387 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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could be less capable of organized thinking and thus incompetent to stand
trial as compared women. If the mentally ill or retarded as a group scored
lower than the "average adult" on competency tests, all those with these
mental disabilities would be incompetent to stand trial. Evidently, this
finding would be even more necessary if that population scored lower than
the "average juvenile." There is no necessary end to comparison groups.
Age could prove to be a factor. Twenty-year-olds may not be as competent
as fifty-year-olds, while forty-year-olds may be less competent than
seventy-year-olds. Assuming a fairly bright group of retirees can be located
and tested as a comparison group, as long as their scores were better than
younger adults, it might be impossible to prosecute anyone younger than
sixty years old.
Another problem with this premise is that juveniles of the same age are
not necessarily on the same developmental page. There will be
considerable variation in the capabilities of all fifteen-year-olds, some of
whom will be more capable than some adults. As Grisso notes, they will
differ markedly in their ability-and inclination-to:
* take an active role in decision making and monitoring the trial process;
" consider both short-range and long-range consequences when making
decisions;
* respond to assistance offered by parents and attorneys; and
* manage their behavior both inside and outside the courtroom ....388
Thus, there could be sub-groups of juveniles less competent than other
juvenile groups (who, in turn, could be more competent than some groups
of adults). Perhaps public school-educated adolescents, overall, would not
fare as well as private school students. Or perhaps delinquents would score
lower, on average, than non-delinquents on competency tests; if so, then no
delinquent would ever be able to stand trial.
A defendant must be personally and individually incompetent to stand
trial, not just the member of a group that overall or collectively has more
incompetent members than some other group. Competency to stand trial is
about thresholds, not about relative abilities or relative standings. That is,
all defendants who fulfill the Dusky requirements are competent to stand
trial, regardless of whether one group of these defendants is better equipped
than another generally in terms of satisfying the Dusky criteria. Otherwise,
all juveniles would escape from criminal liability simply because some of
them-and not necessarily the ones who are facing trial-fall below the
388 Grisso, supra note 125, at 143.
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average adult's capability or score. The adults who fall below the average
juvenile and adult scores, perhaps significantly, but who are above the
Dusky threshold are competent to stand trial, so why would juveniles, en
masse, be incompetent to stand trial and collectively receive a walk?
Finally, what is most ironic and problematic about this premise is that
while juveniles tended to perform less well than adults in some aspects of
some of the tests in some of the research studies, overwhelming majorities
of all youths scored above the threshold acknowledged as competent by the
DPs. Thus, vast majorities of all study participants were competent to stand
trial even though adolescents may have been less clearly above the
threshold than adults in general. An analogy could be drawn to research
comparing delinquents' and non-delinquents' school performance. If a
study found delinquents (with an average grade of 75) were overall less
academically accomplished than non-delinquents (with an average grade of
85), delinquents, as a class, could be labeled failures despite their average
passing grade, and even though an overwhelming majority could have
graduated.
3. That Some or Most Juveniles of a Certain Age Are Actually Incompetent
to Stand Trial Means All Juveniles of That Age Are Incompetent to Stand
Trial
The DPs rely again on the group idea in suggesting that simply
because some or perhaps most youths of a particular age-for example,
eleven to thirteen years old-would be found incompetent to stand trial,
that amounts to a determination that all youths of that age should be
considered incompetent. Ironically, the vast majority (70%) of adolescents
of this age were competent to stand trial, according to the MacArthur
Study.389 This did not prevent the authors of that study from concluding,
however, that no juveniles of that age group should be transferred to
criminal court due to being incompetent to stand trial in that forum, even
though only 30% were "significantly impaired.
390
According to this logic, if 30% or perhaps less of the mentally ill or
retarded population were to be found incompetent to stand trial, that would
mean no individual with this designation could be prosecuted for any
crimes. But even mentally disabled defendants with significant difficulties
in comprehension and communication must individually be found
incompetent to stand trial.
389 See Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 344.
390 See id.
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4. That Competency to Stand Trial Is About Maturity of Judgment and
Perfect Defendants
Historically, competency to stand trial has focused upon the
defendant's cognitive capacities. Research has demonstrated that juveniles,
particularly those fourteen and fifteen years of age and older, have cognitive
capacities that rival adults when it comes to making decisions about and
consenting to medical procedures.391 Moreover, adolescents aged fifteen
and older are no more likely than adults to suffer from what is called the
"personal fable" (the belief that one's behavior is not governed by the same
rules of nature that apply to everyone else), and are no less likely than
adults to employ rational algorithms in decision-making.392
Because the cognitive focus has failed to demonstrate that large
numbers of juveniles are incompetent to stand trial, the DPs have broadened
and shifted the inquiry to maturity of judgment.393 There are no limits to
what maturity of judgment can include: self-reliance or healthy autonomy,
the ability to understand the complexity of a situation and to place it in a
broader context, temperance or the ability to limit impulsivity, the ability to
resist peer pressure, an appropriate attitude toward and perception of risk, or
a balance of short-term and long-term perspectives. 394 Moreover, juveniles'
judgment can be slightly less developed or immature as compared to adults
in any of these areas, and they can qualify as incompetent to stand trial.
One DP, who has boldly asserted that "juveniles do not have the requisite
competency to stand trial in criminal court,, 39 5 described a juvenile
defendant (who killed two and wounded thirteen at Santana High School in
Santee, California):
Williams made a subjectively rational decision, yet had he exercised the requisite
responsibility, autonomy, perspective and temperance, he would have demonstrated a
more reasonable, mature sense of judgment. Therefore, adolescent choice to
391 See, e.g., Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 123; Ronald W. Belter & Thomas Grisso,
Children's Recognition of Rights Violations in Counseling, 15 PROF. PSYCHOL: RES. & PRAC.
899 (1984); Grisso & Vierling, supra note 124; Lewis, supra note 123; Weithom &
Campbell, supra note 123.
392 See Elizabeth Cauffman, Jennifer Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Justice for
Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Competence and Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 403, 407 (1999).
13 See id. at 407-10.
394 See, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 95; Scott, Reppucci & Woolard, supra
note 99; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 103.
395 Tamera Wong, Comment, Adolescent Minds, Adult Crimes: Assessing a Juvenile's
Mental Health and Capacity to Stand Trial, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 163, 165
(2002).
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participate in criminal activity reflects immaturi ofjudgment despite the display of a
seemingly cognitive decision-making processes.
According to this perspective, juvenile criminality must be regarded as
irresponsible, immature behavior for which youths are entitled to immunity
from criminal prosecution.
Juvenile incompetency to stand trial can also stem from lack of
empathy and an inability to take another's perspective 397 or an inability to
tolerate the stress of trial or to behave appropriately in court,398 including
having "some capacity to tolerate shame, humiliation, loss of respect,
disapproval, and guilt. '399 Moreover, defendants must be motivated to self-
defense (for example, questioning the permissibility of guilty pleas), and
must be able to appraise the likely outcome of the proceedings. 400 It is also
not enough that juveniles simply appreciate the prospect of conviction and
punishment, they must be able to gauge whether the judge will treat them
more or less fairly than other defendants charged with the same crime.
Other factors include a youth's suggestibility, parental influence, and the
defense attorney's personality characteristics. 401 In effect, the DPs want an
idealized defendant, a veritable Philosopher King, in order to be competent
to stand trial. More than just adult-like maturity, juveniles must also
possess wisdom and emotional stability.40 2 Thus, juveniles would have to
be both competent and extremely effective in order to stand trial in criminal
court.
396 Id. at 175-76 (citations omitted).
397 See Grisso, supra note 125.
398 See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS (1988); GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997);
RICHARD E. REDDING, ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE IN JUVENILES: LEGAL AND CLINICAL
ISSUES (2000) (on file with author).
399 Lois B. Oberlander, Naomi E. Goldstein & Caleb N. Ho, Preadolescent Adjudicative
Competence: Methodological Considerations and Recommendations for Practice Standards,
19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 545, 558 (2001).
400 See GRISSO, supra note 398; MELTON ET AL., supra note 398.
401 See Jennifer Woolard, Understanding Violence from a Developmental Perspective,
(Univ. of Fla. Ctr. for Studies in Criminology & Law, Position Paper, 2001) (on file with
author).
402 Bonnie and Grisso express concern that juveniles might not appreciate the impact of
their appearance and demeanor on fact-finders, and that this might place them at a
disadvantage vis-A-vis adults. See Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 351, at 89. Meanwhile, Zapf
and Roesch explain that a defendant's being angry, anxious, or agitated could interfere with
an ability to talk to a lawyer or to testify in court. See Patricia A. Zapf& Ronald Roesch, An
Investigation of the Construct of Competence: A Comparison of the FIT, the MacCAT-CA,
and the MacCA T-T, 29 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 247 (2005).
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As late as 2000, the DPs acknowledged that there was a meaningful
distinction between adjudicative competence (which was also recognized
then as binary or non-relative) and effectiveness of participation. Grisso
explained:
Adjudicative competence directs us to examine the degree to which defendants are
at risk of having deficits that seriously jeopardize their defense in ways that have
constitutional implications, and the decision regarding this question is binary: the
individual either is or is not competent to proceed to trial. In contrast, effectiveness of
participation focuses on a continuum of lesser to greater capacities for contributing to
one's defense, and it provides a foundation for seeking ways to maximize defendants'
effectiveness.
4 0 3
Similarly, Woolard and Repucci declared:
Effective participation goes beyond the consideration of constitutionally required
capacities to include those capacities that might affect the nature and quality of a
defendant's participation but do not cross the threshold of incompetence to stand404
trial ....
Finally, Schmidt, Reppucci, and Woolard spent considerable energy
distinguishing competency from effectiveness by explaining that there is:
[A]n interesting distinction between the concept of adjudicative competence as it is
legally defined and the notion of effective participation as a defendant. Whereas the
legal definition of adjudicative competence establishes a minimum standard of
required capacities for a defendant's case to go forward, effective participation
encompasses abilities beyond those that are constitutionally required that may
influence the quality and nature of a defendant's participation in the trial process
without crossing the threshold for legal competence .... In particular, youths who
have the cognitive capacities required to meet the formal legal criteria for competence
to stand trial under the Dusky standard may nevertheless possess certain
developmental characteristics that impair their effective participation as trial
defendants .... 405
Despite these acknowledgments, the DPs have merged effectiveness
with competence. Today under the DPs' approach, juveniles need to
display both traits to be competent to stand trial.
For example, any waiver of rights by a juvenile stems from
incompetency unless it occurs through seasoned reasoning, and is also
compatible with DPs' expectations:
[W]hen making a decision about waiver of important rights, defendants are free to
place a primary value on their immediate gratification at the expense of their future
welfare, or to opt to please their friends rather than act in their best interests, as long
403 Grisso, supra note 125, at 141 (emphasis added).
404 Jennifer L. Woolard & N. Dickon Reppucci, Researching Juveniles' Capacities as
Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note I 11, at 173, 177 (emphasis added).
405 Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard, supra note 260, at 176-77 (citations omitted).
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as they adequately understand and grasp the consequences of their choices. But if
adolescents place a relatively higher value on immediate gratification than do adults
as a consequence of their developmental immaturity, they na make different legal
choices than they themselves would make 
in their adult years.
The DPs have created the perfect criterion for keeping juvenile
defendants from ever being found competent to stand trial in the maturity of
judgment theory. First, the maturity requirement is immeasurable.
Adolescents mature at different rates and times, and can even experience
periods of regression. In short, they are all over the "maturity map.,, 40 7 Not
only are youths ever shifting within the maturity spectrum, but the inventors
of the maturity of judgment theory admit that the maturity elements are
variable as well and are dependent upon context:
Although we are attempting to formulate a general model of maturity of judgment
that can be applied across a variety of situations, we recognize that whether an
individual actually demonstrates responsibility, temperance, or perspective when
faced with a particular decision likely depends on the nature of the situation and the
social context of the decision. The same adolescent may in some situations behave
responsibly, while in others, irresponsibly; show temperance under certain conditions
but impulsively under others; and demonstrate perspective in some circumstances but
short-sightedness in others. We believe therefore that responsibility, temperance, and
perspective are best considered as dispositions to behave in a given way under
particular conditions, rather than as fixed abilities or competencies that are displayed
independently of context.
4 08
Moreover, there is no agreement as to what constitutes maturity or
how maturity is best measured.40 9  Thus, gauging maturity is a very
subjective analysis that will vary considerably among evaluators. Using
such a requirement as the basis for a competency determination would
create serious equal protection problems in that the determination of
competency would depend upon the particular examiner involved.
406 Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 335. Years ago, Professor Bonnie noted that a
defendant's motives for various actions are irrelevant and that a defendant's reasons for
waiving a right have relevance only if they involve coercive threats. See Richard J. Bonnie,
The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv.
539, 573 (1993). His theory is important to the DPs because he expanded the focus of what
is required to be competent to stand trial by creating the concept of adjudicative competence.
407 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffinan, Adolescents as Adults in Court: A
Developmental Perspective on the Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, 15 SOC. POL'Y
REP., Issue 4, at 3, 4-5 (2001); Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 111, at 24.
408 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence:
Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 249, 252
(1996).
409 See Eileen P. Ryan & Daniel C. Murrie, Competence to Stand Trial and Young
Children: Is the Presumption of Competence Valid?, 5 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 89
(2005).
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Adding to the measurability problem, reliance upon the maturity
criterion places the judge completely at the mercy of the examiner.
Competency analysis has already been severely criticized due to judges'
overreliance upon the examiner's opinion.410 Arguably, that overreliance is
indefensible and unnecessary as judges themselves are qualified to estimate
a defendant's ability in order to satisfy Dusky-that is, to assess basic
comprehension and communication abilities. 411  Basing competency on
maturity will compound the overreliance since judges will not personally be
able to gauge maturity status.
More important, the requirement that juveniles have to be as mature as
adults is unattainable for juveniles. Being found incompetent to stand trial
is guaranteed as juveniles cannot have as developed or as matured a sense
of judgment as do adults. DPs easily assert that no juveniles under the age
of eighteen think now the same way they would if they were much older.
412
Since the only truly or fully competent defendant is the fully matured
defendant, no one would be able to be prosecuted before he or she fully
matured.
DPs posit that juveniles must have a stable identity.413 Youths at the
beginning or middle stages of identity development can make choices that
differ from what they would have chosen after their identity was more
stabilized. Even when juveniles have cognitive abilities that rival those of
adults, DPs can argue that these youths will not be able to apply those
abilities as well as adults when they are in new, ambiguous, or stressful
situations. This is because the cognitive abilities are less well-developed
410 See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Mark C. Bardwell, Law, Psychology, and Competency to
Stand Trial: Problems with and Implications for High-Profile Cases, 11 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y
REV. 16 (2000); Melissa L. Cox & Patricia A. Zapf, An Investigation of Discrepancies
Between Mental Health Professionals and the Courts in Decisions About Competency, 28
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 108 (2004); Keith R. Cruise & Richard Rogers, An Analysis of
Competency to Stand Trial: An Integration of Case Law and Clinical Knowledge, 16 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 35 (1998); James H. Reich & Linda Tookey, Disagreements Between Court and
Psychiatrist on Competency to Stand Trial, 47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 29 (1986).
411 Grant H. Morris, Ansar M. Haroun & David Naimark, Assessing Competency
Competently: Toward a Rational Standard for Competency-To-Stand-Trial Assessments, 32
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231, 243 (2004).
412 See, e.g., Lyle, supra note 249, at 15; Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard, supra note 260,
at 179. For example, Bonnie and Grisso claim: "This tendency could lead them to make
choices in the adjudicative process ... that do not reflect the values that they would bring to
bear on the judgment a few short years later when they become adults." Bonnie & Grisso,
supra note 351, at 88. Similarly, Grisso wonders, "[W]hat if the individual's choices
reflected preferences based on a temporary set of values sure to change in a short time?"
Grisso, supra note 125, at 160.
413 See Grisso, supra note 107, at 32.
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414due to their recent acquisition. For example, the DPs offer an illustration
that purports to demonstrate incompetence in a juvenile defendant. The
theoretical case involves a sixteen-year-old charged with felony murder and
facing a twenty-five-year minimum sentence. He refused a plea bargain
offer of a seventeen-year sentence despite the presence of strong evidence
indicating guilt. This decision illustrates the youth's incompetency,
according to DP logic:
Discussion with the examinee indicated that his decision making regarding the plea
agreement and his insistence to go forward with a trial was significantly affected by
his consideration of the 17-year sentence in light of his own age, and he specifically
stated that the sentence was for a period of time longer than he had lived. Thus,
although this 16-year old 'knew' that he faced a minimum of 25 years in prison if he
was convicted, and he understood that a conviction was highly likely, his decision
making was affected by his age and appreciation of time and was likely quite different
than the decision making and appreciation of a 32-year-old male who might find
himself in the same predicament.41-5
How and why the thinking of a thirty-two-year-old became the essence
of competency is not explained by the authors. The DPs admit that few
adults are perfect defendants.416 The thinking of the sixteen-year-old may or
may not have been different than that of a thirty-two-year-old. It certainly
would not be strange to find many thirty-two-year-olds making the same
decision to go to trial. Moreover, a "different" decision does not equate to
an incompetent decision. Conviction and a twenty-five-year minimum
sentence were highly likely, but not guaranteed. A clearly thinking sixteen-
year-old could have thought that an eight-year reduction was not a
sufficient discount for his guilty plea. Rejection of this offer surely does
not automatically constitute an absence of logic, let alone render the
defendant incompetent to stand trial.
An analogy to the mentally ill or retarded population is appropriate.
Clearly the mere presence of mental illness or retardation does not amount
to incompetency to stand trial.417 Grisso explained that "[t]he issue is
whether, and how, the mental disorder actually affects the defendant's
abilities to perform those functions that are required for the defendant's trial
participation. Not all defendants with mental disorders, even those that
414 See id.
415 Otto & Goldstein, supra note 105, at 182-83.
416 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REv. 793, 817 (2005).
417 Bruce A. Arrigo, Justice and the Deconstruction of Psychological Jurisprudence: The
Case of Competence to Stand Trial, 7 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 55, 58 (2003).
2009]
JOSEPH B. SANBORN, JR.
involve psychotic delusions, necessarily experience symptoms that interfere
with their trial participation.
''4 8
Calling for youth or immaturity alone to be the basis for incompetency
to stand trial would be like allowing mental illness or retardation alone to
qualify as incompetent. A better case can be made for mental illness or
retardation automatically to be grounds for incompetency, since these
individuals are likely to have impaired thinking capabilities, and not simply
underdeveloped or developing capabilities. Compared to the general
population, those with mental disorders could have:
" less clarity in their thinking and analysis abilities;
* less ability to appraise the likely outcome of the proceedings;
" less overall understanding of the proceedings;
" less ability to empathize with others;
* less ability to tolerate the stress of trial;
* less ability to behave properly in court;
* less memory about events;
* less ability to think long-term;
• less ability to defer gratification;
* less ability to relate to defense counsel;
" less inclination to disclose information to counsel;
" less ability to discuss strategy with counsel;
* more susceptibility to the suggestions and urgings of others;
* more impaired communication skills;
" more paranoia and distrust of counsel and judges; and
* more problems in experiencing psychotic delusions.
5. That Competency to Stand Trial Requires Belief in the Ideals of the
Adversary Process
Not only must juvenile defendants be ideal or perfect, they also must
readily accept an idealized conception of adversariness. For example,
cynical or distrustful attitudes toward defense counsel are described as
"misunderstandings and distortions of the attorney-client relationship. 419
These misunderstandings and distortions then become the foundation of a
incompetency determination. Under the DPs' approach, to be found
competent to stand trial, juveniles must accept the following:
418 THOMAS GRIsso, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 84-85 (1998).
419 Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard, supra note 260, at 181.
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(1) There is a true adversarial nature in juvenile court (that is,
prosecutors and defense attorneys battle in pursuit of justice rather than
compromise in pursuit of convenience); 42
0
(2) All information provided the defense attorney remains confidential
(counsel will not repeat anything the defendant says to the parents, the
judge, opposing counsel, etc.); 421
(3) Defense attorneys are true advocates (counsel will do all they can
to beat the case); 422
(4) Defendants must be truthful with their defense attorneys and tell all
(it is wrong to think that counsel will be less of an advocate if the
defendant's guilt has been acknowledged by the defendant); 423
(5) Lack of confidence or trust in defense counsel or the system, or
failure to develop a meaningful relationship with counsel is unwise and
uncalled for (counsel and the system will not mistreat accused offenders).424
Grisso explained that youths must have meaningful collaboration with
defense counsel "because of the attorney's advocacy role and the promise
of confidentiality. ,425 However, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
Grisso's advocacy of meaningful relationships between defendant and
counsel in Morris v. Slappy.426
Research in juvenile court has reported defense attorneys who consider
the parents to be their clients (so much for confidentiality),427 and who
actually seek adjudications in order to ensure that the youth receives
treatment (so much for legal advocacy).428 Juveniles with previous court
experience may already be aware that telling the defense attorney
420 See id. at 177; Schnyder, supra note 164, at 36.
421 See Michele Peterson-Baladi & Rona Abramovitch, Children's Knowledge of the
Legal System: Are They Competent to Instruct Legal Counsel?, 34 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139
(1992); Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard, supra note 260, at 177; see also, e.g., REDDING,
supra note 398, at 6 ("Young adolescents often incorrectly believe that their attorney will
reveal confidential information to the judge or police.").
422 See Thomas Grisso, Michael 0. Miller & Bruce Sales, Competency to Stand Trial in
Juvenile Court, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 12 (1987); Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard,
supra note 260, at 177; Lyle, supra note 249, at 49-52.
423 See Redlich, Silverman & Steiner, supra note 267, at 405; Schmidt, Reppucci &
Woolard, supra note 260, at 178.
424 See Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard, supra note 260, at 180; Schnyder, supra note 164,
at 75.
425 Grisso, supra note 107, at 31.
426 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
427 See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., How Parents Can Affect the Processing of Delinquents in
Juvenile Court, 7 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REv. 1, 11 (1995).
428 See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Remnants of Parens Patriae in the Adjudicatory Hearing:
Is a Fair Trial Possible in Juvenile Court?, 40 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 599, 605-06 tbl.3
(1994).
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everything means the attorney cannot allow the defendant to take the stand
and lie about the incident. In addition, defense attorneys could more
eagerly pursue a plea bargain in lieu of a trial when their clients have
acknowledged guilt. Yet the DPs regard juveniles who fail to endorse
ideals as incompetent to stand trial. Ironically, the vast majority of the
youths who have been examined by the DPs as research subjects likely
learned their views as a result of being prosecuted in juvenile court. They
very likely have never been to criminal court. Any youth who rejects one
or all of the preceding propositions on juvenile court adversariness after
having experienced juvenile court should most likely be regarded as
particularly perceptive rather than as cynical, distrustful, or incompetent.
6. That Competency to Stand Trial Requires That Defendants Share DPs'
Values and Perspectives
According to the DPs, juveniles also must adopt the DPs' views of the
defendants' situations. "Wrong" answers to tactical choices or
"inappropriate" reactions qualify to render one incompetent to stand trial.
The previously discussed theoretical case of the sixteen-year-old who
rejected the seventeen-year sentence offer is a good example. The DP's
failure to agree with the defendant's choice, regardless of his motives,
suffices for an incompetency finding.
The DPs describe the need for defendants to understand the gravity of
429potential consequences of a criminal conviction in order to be competent.
The critical question becomes, then, gravity according to whom?
Competency demands a defendant's awareness that a conviction will
potentially result in a ten-year prison sentence. But the DPs demand more;
they want defendants to share their opinions on the gravity of the
consequences. Thus, whereas that ten-year sentence could surely impress a
DP accustomed to the good life, the failure of that same sentence to equally
impress a juvenile offender supposedly constitutes incompetency. Repeat
offenders' experiences with a juvenile justice system known for humane
and possibly beneficial, rehabilitation-oriented dispositions (some youths
end up in a facility that is an improvement over where they have lived)
could also render them unimpressed with threatened sanctions for criminal
behavior. The point is that neither juveniles nor adults need to have the
same reactions to punishment as the DPs in order to be competent to stand
trial.
429 See, e.g., GRiSSO, supra note 398.
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7. That Competency to Stand Trial Matters Less in Juvenile Court Than in
Criminal Court
Underlying the DPs' approach to this subject is a belief that
competency to stand trial in juvenile court is not critical or at least not as
critical as it is in adult court. Considering the potential length of juvenile
court sentences and the ability to factor juvenile court adjudications into
criminal court sentencing, this reasoning is fundamentally wrong. It does
tend to support a theory, however, that the DPs' research and policy
pursuits have been more concerned with ensuring that juvenile defendants
do not see criminal court rather than ensuring that only truly competent
juvenile defendants stand trial in either system. As one defense attorney in
the DP camp offered: "If a finding of incompetence could secure the
minor's adjudication in juvenile court, a lawyer should think twice about
engaging in efforts to enhance her client's trial competence in adult
court.
4 3 0
B. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DPS' STUDY OF JUVENILES'
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
1. Competency to Stand Trial Research Tests Do Not Actually Measure
Competency
Neither the earlier measures-the Competency Screening Test, The
GCCT and the FIT-R-nor the MacCAT-CA constitute a valid assessment
of competency to stand trial. While research can tell us what to look for in
terms of a defendant's deficiencies and what can be done to improve
competence, it cannot tell us if any group of juveniles is competent. 431 The
research tests yield high rates of false positives, 432 which probably explains
why they are not typically employed by evaluators who actually determine
a defendant's competency.433 The Competency Screening Test and the
430 Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles' Competence as
Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 111, at 243, 252 (2000).
431 See Ficke, Hart & Deardorff, supra note 365; Woolard & Reppucci, supra note 404.
432 See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 398; Robert A. Nicholson, Stephen R. Briggs &
Helen C. Robertson, Instruments for Assessing Competency to Stand Trial: How Do They
Work?, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRACT. 383 (1988); Richard Rogers, Karen L. Ustad &
Kenneth Sewell, Dimensions of Incompetency: A Factor Analytic Study of the Georgia Court
Competency Test, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 323 (1996); Karen L. Ustad et al., Restoration of
Competency to Stand Trial: Assessment with the Georgia Court Competency Test and the
Competency Screening Test, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1996).
433 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Logic and Reliability of Evaluations of Competence
to Stand Trial, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519 (1998).
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GCCT are especially problematic.434 They measure current knowledge of
court procedure rather than an ability to comprehend proceedings and to
assist counsel. 435 The Competency Screening Test demands an idealized
perception of the legal system, and has validity problems, particularly in
discriminating against defendants who doubt judicial fairness or disagree
with attorney advice.436
The test contains twenty-two statements that the subject completes.437
The scoring for at least nineteen of these statements is subjective and
arbitrary, if not capricious. For example, the person who responds to "The
lawyer told Bill.. ." with "to plead guilty" receives a full two points, while
the one who answers "he is guilty" receives only one point. Points are
reduced because the defendant seems to regard the lawyer as judgmental.438
Similarly, saying that the defendant "pleaded not guilty" merited two
points, while a defendant "denied it" warranted only one point. The
appropriate response to a formal accusation is to plead not guilty, which
accounts for the point reduction.439 Ironically, most juvenile courts do not
employ guilty plea terminology, but rather refer to admitting to or denying
the charges.
The FIT-R operates more like a final exam in a legal course than an
analysis of the defendant's ability to understand what is occurring in court.
The Understanding section of the test includes everything from the charges
to the roles of the individuals to the court process. The Appreciation
section demands that a defendant identify available legal defenses and the
likely outcome of the proceeding. The Communication with Counsel
section examines the defendant's ability to relate to lawyers and to plan
legal strategy, both of which are beyond the scope of competency to stand
trial.440
The FIT-R outcome also relies upon the defendant's motive in
accepting a plea bargain offer from the prosecutor. Apparently, the only
"sound" motive for which one is considered to be competent to stand trial is
434 Problems attending the GCCT-Juvenile Version were thoroughly examined during the
discussion of Cooper's dissertation and will not be repeated here. See Cooper, supra note
147; supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
435 See GRisso, supra note 398; Bumett, supra note 223.
436 See Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study:
Development and Validation of a Research Instrument, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 158
(1997).
431 See LAB. OF CMTY. PSYCHIATRY, HARVARD MED. SCH., COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
AND MENTAL ILLNESS 74 (1972) (Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, Crime and Delinquency
Issues: A Monograph Series (1972)).
438 Id. at 76.
439 Id. at 77-78.
440 See Roesch et al., supra note 317.
[Vol. 99
JUVENILES' COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
the weight of the evidence against the accused.441 This is not the only
legitimate reason to forgo trial, especially for defendants in juvenile court
who could have learned in previous visits that the lack of a case is not an
obstacle to adjudication. Defendants who want to plea bargain due to a
need for closure or from moral guilt, embarrassment, fatigue, resignation, or
perhaps even a fear of receiving a harsher disposition for going to trial are
not incompetent to stand trial by virtue of these motivations. Wanting to
"get it over with" may or may not be legally wise, but it is not equivalent to
being incompetent.
The same argument applies to defendants' anticipating whether they
will appeal, should the prosecutor make a serious error. A response of no
on the FIT-R is scored negatively and could contribute to a finding of
incompetent to stand trial. The no response does not render one
incompetent, however, even if the response is legally unwise. Youths
might think that they would have to return to detention should they pursue
an appeal, and might prefer to just have the matter behind them. The
defendant may already know the likely disposition, and prefer not to risk
losing it via reopening the case. Perhaps the youth has been committed to a
facility that has an open bed now, one that would be lost pending an appeal.
Even more likely, some youths could have been told by their defense
attorneys that there is no real benefit to appeal since any appellate decision
would likely occur after the disposition has terminated, and most appeals
are unsuccessful anyway.
The MacCAT-CA has its own problems and cannot be considered an
accurate measure of competency to stand trial. Even the developers of the
MacCAT-CA acknowledge that it cannot be the sole basis for a competency
assessment and that it is not intended as a test of competency. 442 Similar to
other research-oriented tests, it measures knowledge rather than capacity to
understand rights and the process as explained to the youth. It also forces
the youth to focus on someone else's case via a vignette.
The vignettes themselves are problematic, too. One asks: if "Fred"
pleads guilty, can he still try to prove his innocence? A yes is considered
incorrect and receives no points. The MacCAT-CA tries to tap into the
respondent's awareness that a guilty plea dispenses with a trial. The
question is badly formed, especially for juvenile court. A yes response
could actually be correct. The participant might think that testimony may
be offered after one admits guilt, and that the judge would accept the
explanation and find not guilty. Unlike criminal court, juvenile courts often
require both involvement in the behavior and a need for treatment in order
441 See Viljoen et al., supra note 314, at 264-65.
442 See Otto et al., supra note 214.
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to be adjudicated. Defense counsel may believe it wise to admit guilt and
hope that the judge will listen to the explanation and reduce or throw out
the charges.443
Another question asks if it is more important for "Fred" to tell his
attorney that he was drinking beer before the fight in which he assaulted
someone or to explain that he was out to dinner with a girlfriend.
Incorrectly picking the dinner story nets zero points. Adults might think
having been to dinner shows they weren't looking for a fight, while
drinking could make them look worse. Demanding the juvenile pick beer
drinking to receive points requires admitting one offense to mitigate a
second. Moreover, the juvenile could think that a revealed substance abuse
problem could exacerbate the ultimate disposition and that drinking beer
before a fight does not mitigate culpability.
The focus of the test is problematic as well. A defendant's
understanding of the trial process should not involve receiving points for
offering "plausible" reasons for choosing between a bench and a jury trial.
Many youths may have experienced or may have been told by defense
attorneys that juvenile court judges will adjudicate regardless of the
strength of evidence. Perhaps this would help explain why defendants with
previous juvenile court experience perform "poorly" on these competency
to stand trial tests.
2. Examining a Defendant's Miranda Comprehension Does Not Determine
Competency to Stand Trial
A number of studies that have focused on juvenile competency to
stand trial have included and relied upon an analysis of youth's
comprehension of Miranda issues. Although the examination of youths'
Miranda comprehension is worthwhile, the results are not an indication of
competency. What juveniles think they would or should do during police
interrogation does not address their ability to remember the incident, to
communicate with counsel, or to understand trial. Juveniles could be
Miranda illiterates, and yet be quite competent to stand trial.444
443 Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Plea Negotiation in Juvenile Court 108-09 (Dec. 14, 1984)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York at Albany) (on file with
author).
444 Redlich, Silverman & Steiner, supra note 267, at 394.
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3. Examining Only Delinquents, Especially Only Those Detained, Does Not
Yield a Representative Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial Score
Ironically, the DPs who portray delinquency as a trait that is common
among all youths445 also disproportionately measure competency to stand
trial among detained delinquents. Juvenile offenders are subject to criminal
prosecution whether or not they have a previous criminal history or have
been detained. To derive a representative sample of the typical juvenile
defendant eligible for criminal prosecution, research should address all
juveniles, or at least all of those arrested during a certain period of time.
Instead, the DPs have drawn juvenile samples exclusively or
disproportionately from detention,446 long term facilities,447 psychiatric
inpatient facilities, 448 or from treatment centers used for competency
evaluations.449 If the research that examines delinquency theory were this
selectively focused, the approach would be criticized, and the results
considered invalid and unreliable.
In many jurisdictions, fewer than 20% of younger juveniles (that is,
450those fifteen years of age and younger) will experience detention. Unlike
jail, detention is known as a holding ground for offenders with problems.451
Not surprising, the MacArthur Study found that detained youths scored
significantly higher than community youths on numerous measures, such as
Alcohol/Drug Use, Angry/Irritable, Depressed/Anxious, Somatic
Complaints, Suicide Ideation, and Thought Disturbance.452 The mean
estimated IQ score of Ficke and co-researchers' all-detained group was
76.17, and that of Burnett's detained "offender group" was 84.16 (the
445 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from
Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 111, at 291, 300; Scott &
Grisso, supra note 112, at 154-56; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 103, at 156.
446 See, e.g., Ficke, Hart & Deardorff, supra note 365; Grisso et al., supra note 276;
Boyd, supra note 213; Burnett, supra note 223; Krause, supra note 185; Viljoen, supra note
313; Woolard, supra note 106.
447 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 147; Schnyder, supra note 164.
448 See, e.g., Warren et al., supra note 305; Lexcen, supra note 237.
449 See, e.g., Cowden & McKee, supra note 136; McKee & Shea, supra note 143;
McKee, supra note 141.
450 See JOSEPH B. SANBORN, JR. & ANTHONY W. SALERNO, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM: LAW AND PROCESS (2005); see also HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 National
Report, at 170. Even for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds the rate of detention is less than
25%. See id.
451 See, e.g., Karen M. Abram et al., Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in
Juvenile Detention, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1097, 1098 (2003); Linda A. Teplin et
al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Detention, 59 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133,
1134-37 (2002).
452 MacArthur Research Network, supra note 187, at 12.
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"comparison group" mean was 101.6). 453 Similarly, the intellectual
functioning of Viljoen's all-detained sample was "substantially below
expected developmental levels. For example, the reasoning abilities of
defendants aged 16 to 17 did not even reach the average performance of 10-
year olds in community samples. 454 Consequently, the test scores of the
samples in the DPs' research on competency to stand trial cannot be said to
reflect the competency of juvenile defendants in general.
4. The Lack of a Standard Measure ofAdults' Competency to Stand Trial
Compromises Research
The lack of a representative juvenile competency score is exacerbated
by the absence of an adult standard score. Very different results have
occurred due to the use of three different adult sets of MacCAT-CA scores:
the normative study that first tested the MacCAT-CA (the Otto 1
standard),455 another version of the Otto normative data used by Boyd in her
dissertation (the Otto 2 standard),456 and the MacArthur Study standard.457
Table 2
Adult Mean MacCA T-CA Mean Scores
U R A
Otto 1 12.5 13.27 11.44
Otto 2 12.17 12.73 11.23
MacArthur 12.13 12.57 10.77
V. THE ULTIMATE PROBLEMS IN THE DPs' STUDY OF JUVENILE
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
A. THE LACK OF A JUVENILE COMPETENCY PROBLEM
Starting from the worst case scenario of the critical MacArthur Study,
only 30% of the youngest adolescents (eleven- to thirteen-year-olds) and
only 19% of the fourteen- and fifteen-year-old group "failed" the MacCAT-
CA in displaying supposed significant impairment. Those 30% and 19%
figures themselves are inflated, as acknowledged by the MacArthur
453 See Ficke, Hart & Deardorff, supra note 365, at 368; Burnett, supra note 223, at 58-
60.
454 Viljoen, supra note 313, at 56.
455 See Otto et al., supra note 214, at 440.
456 See Boyd, supra note 213, at 61.
457 See Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 343.
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researchers. 45 8 Forensic evaluators would find a much lower percentage of
early- and mid-adolescent defendants incompetent to stand trial than did the
MacArthur Study and other DP research. The numbers of incompetent
juvenile defendants would certainly decrease once the focus of competency
evaluations is restricted to legitimate, cognitive Dusky-oriented abilities.
The MacArthur Study acknowledged that much of what they found was not
about competency to stand trial:
The study indicates that psychosocial immaturity may affect a young person's
decisions, attitudes, and behavior in the role of defendant in ways that do not directly
implicate competence to stand trial, but that may be quite important to how they make
choices, interact with police, relate to their attorneys, and respond to the trial
context.
4 59
In addition, 99% or more youths transferred to criminal court tend to
be fourteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, at least in the
most transfer-prone state, Florida. In that state between 2001 and 2006,
only thirty-one youths age thirteen or younger (six of whom were twelve or
younger) were transferred to criminal court.460
There is no widespread problem regarding incompetency to stand trial
among juvenile defendants facing trial in criminal court. Considering the
minimal cognitive abilities required to be competent to stand trial, this is
hardly surprising. It is also hardly surprising in light of the abundant
research that has documented competent juvenile decision-making abilities
in other, more demanding contexts. For example, juveniles who are
fourteen years of age have been found capable of making informed and
competent decisions concerning consent to medical and mental health
treatment.46t Similarly, girls between the ages of fourteen and seventeen
458 See Steinberg et al., supra note 112, at 11.
459 Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 361 (emphasis added); Steinberg et al., supra note
112, at 13. Bonnie, who created the two-dimensional formula for competency to stand trial,
said the lack of competency in the decisional competence category-the only category in
which juveniles display weaknesses-is not a bar to conducting trial. See Bonnie, supra
note 406, at 555.
460 See FLA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 2005-2006 DELINQUENCY PROFILE (2007),
available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/Research/DelinquencyProfile/0506_Profile.html.
461 See, e.g., Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 123; Belter & Grisso, supra note 391;
Stephen Bates Billick, Developmental Competency, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 301
(1986); Nancy Kaser-Boyd et al., Children's Understanding of Risks and Benefits of
Psychotherapy, 15 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 165 (1986); Nancy Kaser-Boyd, Howard S.
Adelman & Linda Taylor, Minors' Ability to Identify Risks and Benefits of Therapy, 16
PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAc. 411 (1985); Patricia A. King, Treatment and Minors: Issues
Not Involving Lifesaving Treatment, 23 J. FAM. L. 241 (1984); Lewis, supra note 123; Gary
B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as Values in
Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983); Richard E. Redding, Children's
Competence to Provide Informed Consent for Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
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who were considering abortions appeared similar to adults in both cognitive
462competency and volition.
The findings of the research in these other decision-making areas have
been so consistent in establishing juvenile competency that some
psychologists are willing to assert that when it comes to "the capacity to
understand and reason logically, there is no qualitative or quantitative
difference between minors in mid-adolescence, i.e., about fourteen to
fifteen years of age, and adults. 463 Similarly, "Regardless of the standard
of capacity used, research shows that by the age of about fourteen or fifteen,
,A464
most children will demonstrate full adult competence ....
The American Psychological Association was so convinced of the
reasoning abilities of adolescents that on a number of occasions it submitted
briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court that boldly asserted:
[There is a] growing body of methodologically sound and generally accepted
psychological research which concludes that minors fourteen years of age and older
generally possess the ability to understand treatment alternatives and their attendant
risks and benefits, as well as the demonstrated capacity for rational decisionmaking to
a degree that is not measurably different from that of adults.
465
Developmental psychologists have built a rich body of research examining
adolescents' capacities for understanding, reasoning, solving problems and making
decisions, especially in comparison to the same capacities in adults. Research
consistently supports the conclusion that there is a predictable development during
late childhood and early adolescence of the capacity to think rationally about
increasingly complex problems and decisions. Although there are several competing
theories of cognitive development, these theories each recognize that a revolution in
rationality occurs during early adolescence. The specific reasoning abilities that
develop during early adolescence are closely akin to the capacity to consent, and
include the capacity to reason abstractly about hypothetical situations; the capacity to
reason about multiple alternatives and consequences; the capacity to consider more
variables and combine variables in more complex ways; and the capacity for
systematic, exhaustive use of information .... In fact, by middle adolescence (age
14-15) young people develop abilities similar to adults in reasoning about moral
REv. 695 (1993); Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 123. Some research has made this
finding at the age of fifteen. See, e.g., Grisso & Vierling, supra note 124; Mann et al., supra
note 124.
462 See Ambuel & Rappaport, supra note 123.
463 Brief for American Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at
18, Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (No. 85-673). In the footnote accompanying
this sentence, the authors continue: "Moreover, progressively increasing numbers of younger
adolescents demonstrate such capacities as they proceed through the developmental
transition typical of ages 11-14 [sic]." Id.
464 Redding, supra note 461, at 726.
465 Brief for American Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 4,
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-
495) (citations omitted).
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dilemmas, understanding social rules and laws, reasoning about interpersonal
relationships and interpersonal problems, and reasoning about custody preferences
during parental divorce. By middle adolescence most young people develop an adult-
like identity and understanding of self. Furthermore, the majority of adolescents do
not repudiate parental values, but incorporate them, during their search for autonomy.
Thus, by age 14 most adolescents have developed adult-like intellectual and social
capacities including specific abilities outlined in law as necessary for understanding
treatment alternatives, considering risks and benefits, and giving legally competent
consent.
466
More intriguing is research that has discovered significant decision-
making capacity among even younger youths:
A sizeable and convincing body of empirical research has accumulated over the last
decade suggesting that children have much more competence than has been
recognized by the legal community. The general picture which emerges is that
children are capable of quite a lot, if you just let them participate in the
decisionmaking process.
Adolescents, and frequently even younger children, are capable of adult-like
understanding and decisionmaking. For instance, children as young as about twelve
appear to have a factual understanding and appreciation for the risks and benefits of
psychotherapy. Discussing unpleasant or uncomfortable issues, discomfort with the
therapist, violations of confidentiality, and poor treatment effectiveness are identified
as risks; having someone to talk with, learning things, and solving problems are seen
as benefits. Even nine-year-olds appear to understand many basic aspects of
treatment, including differences between various diagnoses and prognoses, and
treatment risks and benefits. Twelve-year-olds are able to define accurately many
legal concepts. Significantly, children as young as six can be astute in perceiving
procedural injustice .... 467
B. THE DPS' PROPOSED SOLUTION IS WORSE THAN THE PROBLEM
1. The DPs' solution
Evidencing that their concern is with the prosecution of juvenile
defendants in criminal court rather than the prosecution of incompetent
juvenile defendants per se, the DPs ultimately recommend that juvenile
defendants found incompetent to stand trial in criminal court should be
returned to juvenile court for trial. 468 These so-called "default dispositions"
are necessary so as to avoid an "institutional crisis" that would result if
466 Brief for American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners/Cross-Respondents, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-805,
88-1125, 88-1309), available at 1989 WL 1127529, at *18-20 (citations and footnotes
omitted).
467 Redding, supra note 461, at 708 (citations omitted).
468 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 416, at 826-27.
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"large numbers" of incompetent juvenile defendants could not be
prosecuted anywhere or at all.469
The DPs advocate the adoption of a new standard for competency to
stand trial in juvenile court:
[Y]ouths who are incompetent under the Dusky standard can be subject to a relaxed
competence standard in juvenile court without violating constitutional norms so long
as the dispositions to which they are subject are different in purpose and punitiveness
from criminal sentences.470
Simply put, if juvenile court punishes less or just differently than adult
court, defendants prosecuted there can be less competent than their
counterparts in adult court.
The DPs also hold that competency to stand trial itself is relative,
subject to gradations: "As a purely conceptual matter, the adoption of dual
standards is quite feasible because competence, unlike many procedural
protections is largely a continuous rather than a binary construct." 471 The
DPs warn that failure to adopt their "relaxed" competency standard in
juvenile court will lead to "serious disruption" in the prosecution of
delinquency cases because forcing a "uniform competence standard" (i.e.,
Dusky) upon juvenile court will produce "a flood of petitions for
competence evaluations and hearings, resulting in a major diversion of
financial and human resources to a process that most would agree should
have limited importance in this legal setting.
472
This proposition is puzzling. Statutes and case law have applied
Dusky to juvenile courts for years.473 Yet, there has been barely a trickle
(let alone a flood) of appellate case law in this area and no widespread
reports of disruption in juvenile court. By far, however, the most puzzling
aspect of the DPs' proposal is their description of the "tailored juvenile
court standard. 4 74 "Under the competence criteria that [the DPs] endorse, a
youth facing a delinquency proceeding must have a basic understanding of
the charges and proceeding and of her position as defendant in that
proceeding, and the capacity to communicate with her attorney., 475 Of
course, this "relaxed," "tailored" standard is indistinguishable from that
established by Dusky.
469 See id. at 827.
471 Id. at 827-28.
471 Id. at 834.
472 Id. at 835-36 (emphasis added).
473 See supra Parts III-IV.
474 See Scott & Grisso, supra note 416, at 836.
475 Id. at 838 (footnote omitted).
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The DPs explain that the juvenile court standard means the youth
could have a "lesser ability to foresee remote consequences" of a conviction
and still be competent.476 But a greater or lesser ability to foresee remote
consequences not only defies measurement, it also is not related to or
required by competency criteria.. The DPs also assert that youths would
"need not understand how advocacy is translated into practice in a way that
would be required of an adult," 477 whatever that means; but this, too, is not
measurable and is not related to or required for competency to stand trial.
Finally, the DPs contend that youths "need not have the ability to weigh the
value of defense strategies, or to advise counsel accordingly,, 478 which also
is not a part of competency to stand trial and thus also not required of adult
defendants. The DPs have not created a "relaxed" standard of competency
for juvenile court. Instead, the DPs are attempting to rewrite constitutional
law to guarantee no juveniles are prosecuted in adult court.
2. The DPs ' Proposal Fails on Its Merits
There are at least three flaws with the DPs' proposal. The first has
already been considered, namely, that competency to stand trial is not a
continuous construct. Either defendants can comprehend the nature of the
proceedings and assist in their defense or they cannot; if they cannot
perform these minimal tasks, they should not be prosecuted in any court.
Their greater or lesser abilities to foresee the future, appreciate the nature of
defense advocacy, or gauge the worth of defense tactics are not part of
competency to stand trial.
The second is that competency to stand trial is not related to the extent
of the possible punishment. Instead, it is related to the type or nature of the
proceeding. While it is true that some constitutional rights, such as counsel
and jury trial, are linked to the potential sentence, other rights, such as the
protection against self-incrimination and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, are triggered by the mere presence of a criminal
proceeding, regardless of the severity of the outcome. Competency to stand
trial belongs with the latter grouping of rights. By the DPs' own admission,
competency to stand trial is required to preserve the dignity and integrity of
the proceedings; it is unseemly to prosecute a defendant who is incompetent
to stand trial. 479 None of this matters any longer to the DPs as long as the




479 See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 406, at 543, 551; Scott & Grisso, supra note 416, at 800,
809.
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All criminal defendants must be competent. This applies even to
defendants prosecuted in trial courts of limited jurisdiction, which not only
operate with very serious limits on possible sanctions imposed there but
also operate with much less sentencing power than juvenile courts (in terms
of length of sentence). The Supreme Court has equated the adjudicatory
hearing with a criminal prosecution. It did so in In re Gault'" when
granting juveniles the right to counsel and the protection against self-
incrimination; in In re Winship481 when requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict in juvenile court; and in Breed v. Jones482 when prohibiting
sequential prosecution for the same offense in juvenile and criminal courts
due to this constituting double jeopardy-that is, being subject to two
criminal prosecutions. Grisso even admitted a few years ago that Winship
represents "a decision that rests squarely on the premise that the cost of an
erroneous finding of delinquency is equivalent to the cost of an erroneous
criminal conviction.
4 83
Thus, the DPs' proposal must fail when they assert that the adoption of
a relaxed juvenile court standard "depends on whether delinquency
proceedings differ substantially from criminal proceedings .... 484 This
matter has already been resolved conclusively by the Supreme Court.
The argument citing the "shorter duration" of juvenile court sanctions
compared to adult court sentences also fails. First, most convicts in
criminal court are headed to probationary sentences; they are nevertheless
required to be competent to stand trial.485 Second, many youths adjudicated
486in juvenile courts are headed to placements. For some of these youths
there will be longer terms of incarceration than for some adults headed to
jail or prison. Third, juveniles targeted for prosecution in criminal court,
especially the younger ones, tend to be the most serious or chronic
480 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
481 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
482 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
483 Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 351, at 94.
484 Scott & Grisso, supra note 416, at 836.
485 In 2006, there were 4,237,023 adults on probation. That figure was much higher than
the combined numbers in jail (766,010), prison (1,492,973), and parole (798,202). See
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Adults on Probation, in Jail, or Prison, and
on Parole, Table 6.1 (2006), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t612006.pdf. In 2004,
even 28% of felony convictions ended with probationary sentences. See MATTHEW R.
DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2004, at 3 (2007).
486 Yearly, the national estimates of adjudicated juveniles sentenced to placement are in
the 22%-25% range. See C. Puzzanchera & W. Kang, Juvenile Court Statistics Databook
(2008), http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/jcsdb/asp/process.asp. There are no estimates
for the length of sentences given to or served by juvenile inmates.
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offenders. 487 Forcing these youths to be prosecuted in juvenile court will
almost definitely result in that system pursuing the institutionalization of
many, and perhaps most, of these offenders for significant duration.
Consequently, the need for these defendants to be competent to stand trial
in juvenile court will be just as great as in criminal court.
The third flaw involves the reality that juvenile court adjudications can
be factored into subsequent criminal court sentencing. In some
jurisdictions, an adjudication is given an impact equal to a criminal
488conviction. It is unconscionable that a youth who is purportedly
incompetent to stand trial for current criminal court purposes could
experience an adjudication in juvenile court, which is then allowed to
enhance a later sentence in adult court.
3. The DPs' Solution Is Inappropriate
The DPs' solution is inappropriate as well. The DPs found a minority
of selectively identified adolescents to be arguably incompetent to stand
trial. From this they suggest that no youths below a certain age should be
eligible for prosecution in adult court.489 The masses of competent and
possibly mature juvenile defendants among this age group are in effect
receiving immunity from criminal prosecution due to the tendencies of a
small minority of their population. Defendants must individually qualify
for designations as incompetent to stand trial. Grisso acknowledged as
much when addressing consent to treatment.
[B]y age 14 or 15, most minors have probably attained a level of cognitive
functioning (formal operational thinking) that is equivalent to cognitive maturity;
therefore minors at this age should be regarded as competent to give informed
consent, unless individually they fail to meet standards that are employed to determine
the incompetence of sane adults.
490
487 Statutes permitting transfer to adult court tend to raise the severity of offense and
record requirements as the age of the accused decreases. See SANBORN & SALERNO, supra
note 450, at app. G-H.
488 See Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class Punishment: The Use of
Juvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 209-10 (1998).
489 The MacArthur group had suggested no one younger than fourteen years old should
be prosecuted in criminal court. See Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 358. Since that study,
observations have surfaced such that any state prosecuting anyone younger than fifteen or
even sixteen years of age could be risking wholesale prosecution of incompetent defendants.
See, e.g., Feld, supra note 384, at 525; Grisso & Steinberg, supra note 93, at 625. The next
step to be anticipated from the DPs is their requesting an appellate court to extend a Roper-
like categorical exemption to the prosecution of anyone younger than a certain age in
criminal court due to their finding widespread incompetency among these youths in their
studies.
490 Belter & Grisso, supra note 391, at 900.
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There would also be an equal protection problem such that immature
juveniles and adults bound for criminal court would not be immune from
criminal prosecution due simply to being older than an arbitrary age cut-off.
Assuming immaturity is the real culprit, the DPs' solution goes too far in
letting mature competent juveniles escape adult court merely because of
their age and does not go far enough due to its abandoning immature older
adolescents and young adults subjected to trial in adult court.
4. The DPs' Solution Is Unnecessary
The DPs' solution of barring the criminal prosecution of juveniles is
unnecessary. Some DPs admit this. For example, Grisso initially conceded
that for many incompetent juveniles' "judges might simply 'continue' the
case (postpone the trial) until the juvenile has achieved greater maturity. 'A91
In addition, "clinical intervention might compensate for the difficulties
produced by immaturity. 492  Grisso offered that defendants in juvenile
court could be held up to one year for restoration of competency.493 Five
years later, however, Grisso declared, without explanation, that
postponement in criminal court is "both politically inconceivable and
constitutionally problematic. 494 Postponement for months is possible when
adult defendants are initially found incompetent to stand trial, however, so
the Constitution is not a problem. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme
Court held that delay for a "reasonable period of time" is constitutionally
permissible.495 Moreover, prosecution in the adult system is fraught with
considerable delay that would allow for both natural maturing and clinical
intervention, if necessary. If the problem is deficient understanding, even
the MacArthur Study group acknowledged that youths could "be tried as
adults after a period of instruction about the matters they do not
comprehend. 496  This begs the question as to why immature juveniles
cannot similarly be instructed as to risk perception, future time perspective,
pressure from peers, etc. Some DP researchers have conceded that some
juveniles would need merely to have misconceptions clarified or to consult
more thoroughly with defense counsel.497
491 GRisso, supra note 418, at 96.
491 Id. at 120.
491 Id. at 89.
494 Grisso et al., supra note 276, at 360 (footnote omitted).
495 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). In Jackson, the pretrial delay
involved years.
496 Id. at 361.
497 Schnyder, supra note 164, at 86; Viljoen, supra note 313, at 63.
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VI. THE CONCLUSION: MYTHS DISPELLED AND LESSONS LEARNED
CONCERNING JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
A. MYTHS DISPELLED
1. Massive Numbers of Juvenile Defendants Are Incompetent to Stand Trial
Contrary to the assertions of the DPs, the vast majority of juvenile
defendants are competent to stand trial. Even focusing the research
disproportionately on the most troubled (that is, detained) segment of
juvenile offenders could not alter these results. The majority of DP
research has found most juveniles, even at the tender age of eleven years,
know and comprehend enough to satisfy what competency to stand trial
requires. This should hardly be surprising, considering the very low
threshold for competency to stand trial. The DPs' message that, as a group,
even fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds are incompetent to stand trial lacks
credibility. It is inconceivable that the four-year high school today is
populated by youths among whom one-half are incompetent to stand trial.
2. Competency to Stand Trial Is Relative, Group-Determined, and
Associated with Punishment
Contrary to the assertions of the DPs, competency to stand trial is not
an adjustable concept. It is simply wrong to measure and compare overall
results of a group of juveniles versus a group of adults, and then to suggest
that "lower scores" for the one group means that all in that group are "less"
competent than the other and actually are incompetent across the board. If
the focus of this inquiry were race or gender instead of age, there would be
confusion and outrage accompanying the publication of this kind of study.
Competency to stand trial is a personal, individual matter, just as the
insanity defense is. A particular defendant either is or is not competent to
stand trial, and the general tendencies of this defendant's group
characteristics are irrelevant. Also irrelevant is whether more juveniles are
incompetent compared to adults. Finally, the sentence is irrelevant as well.
Before the state can convict or adjudicate any defendant, it is essential that
the accused experiencing that prosecution is legitimately and fully
competent to stand trial.
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B. LESSONS LEARNED
1. Ideology and Not a Constitutional Right Is Driving Research Regarding
Competency to Stand Trial
It is abundantly clear that the DPs' main concern is to prevent the
criminal prosecution of juvenile offenders, rather than to ensure the
prosecution of only competent defendants. If competency to stand trial
were the real concern, DPs should welcome prosecution in criminal court.
The very things that purportedly offend the DPs, such as lesser advocacy by
defense counsel and violation of confidentiality between counsel and
defendant, are trademarks of juvenile court. First, the DPs denigrate
juvenile defendants (and accuse them of being incompetent) for their
believing, perhaps after directly experiencing, that, among other things,
defense attorneys will not work diligently for their acquittal. Then, the DPs
insist that the solution for this alleged incompetency is holding trial in
juvenile court where juvenile defendants are likely to (re)encounter that
very same lack of vigorous representation. And, the DPs are willing to
reduce the supposed competencies associated with competency to stand trial
so as to allow this prosecution to occur in juvenile court. Actually, taking
the DPs' logic to its natural extreme, if juvenile court is to become the
haven for juvenile defendants who are theoretically incompetent to stand
trial, then competent juveniles should be prosecuted in criminal court,
particularly all sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds who regularly outperform
adults on the competency tests employed in DP research.
Rather than proscribing the prosecution of all juvenile offenders below
a certain age in criminal court, the implications of the DPs' research lead to
educating juvenile defendants and to cleaning up a number of items in
juvenile court, including the nature of defense representation. Instead of
militating to enhance the due process attending the prosecution of juvenile
offenders in both juvenile and criminal courts, the DPs propose to promote
injustice in juvenile court by prosecuting incompetent defendants there.
This arrangement creates havoc by creating nebulous boundaries between
the two courts based on subjective, ambiguous, artificial, and malleable
determinations of competency to stand trial.
2. Juveniles Need Classroom Instruction on Their Rights
Disclosed throughout the research into custodial interrogation and
competency to stand trial has been a significant unawareness of the rights
juveniles enjoy. Juveniles need instruction to better comprehend their
rights. Surely this material is as important to many students as the
operation of state and federal governments. This material should be
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included in their studies by middle school. The curriculum may not
compare well with the actual experiences of some who have been processed
by the juvenile court, which could make for interesting classroom
discussions. At least students will be informed of the ways in which
juvenile courts are supposed to operate. Truants and dropouts, who
arguably need this instruction the most, may not receive it. But then it will
be students depriving themselves instead of schools not providing valuable
lessons. This may be what is needed to encourage some to return to school
or to not leave in the first place.
3. Juvenile Defendants Require Extra Attention from Defense Counsel
Whether a criminal charge against a youth is prosecuted in juvenile or
criminal court, the youth deserves and requires special guidance and
instruction. Perhaps, as some research has found, all that might be needed
is for defense counsel to spend some extra time with juvenile clients. It
might also be productive to have special certification for all defense
attorneys who want to work in juvenile court or with juvenile clients in
criminal court. Minimally, defense attorneys should ensure that juvenile
defendants are aware of their rights at all stages of the process, and all court
personnel should verify that youths who waive rights do so intelligently and
voluntarily. To be sure, juvenile defendants may still be vulnerable to peer
influence or unrealistic estimates of the value of plea bargaining versus
trial, but as long as the youth knows what is occurring and the rights, if any,
which are being surrendered, then the youth has made a competent, if not
wise, decision. Neither society nor the Constitution should expect more.
In terms of policy, there are many very valid reasons why the vast
majority of juvenile offenders should not be prosecuted in criminal court.
The desire to ensure that all defendants are competent to stand trial,
however, is not one of them.
2009]
214 JOSEPHB. SANBORN, JR. [Vol. 99
